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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
RONALD ALLRIDGE, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-6834
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 3AN-97-157 Cr
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 1613 - December 24, 1998]
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial
District, Anchorage, Milton M. Souter, Judge.
Appearances: Paul E. Malin, Assistant Public
Defender, and Barbara K. Brink, Public Defender, Anchorage, for
Appellant. Eric A. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho,
Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and
Stewart, Judges.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
Ronald Allridge stole a Land Rover (valued at $25,000 or
more) from a sales lot in downtown Anchorage. For this conduct,
Allridge was indicted for two crimes: first-degree theft as defined
in AS 11.46.120(a), and first-degree vehicle theft as defined in
AS 11.46.360(a)(1).
In this appeal, Allridge contends that he could lawfully
be indicted for only one of these offenses vehicle theft. He
presents two arguments in support of this contention.
First, Allridge asserts that the theft statutes are
specially drafted so as not to apply to the takings of vehicles.
He points out that the definition of "property" contained in
AS 11.81.900(b)(48) does not specifically mention "motor vehicles".
From this, Allridge infers that motor vehicles can not be the
subject of theft in Alaska and that the only statute applicable
to his conduct is therefore the "vehicle theft" statute.
While it is true that the definition of "property" found
in AS 11.81.900(b)(48) does not specifically mention "motor
vehicles", this statute does declare that "property" consists of
"an[y] article, substance, or thing of value, including ... tangible
... personal property". We conclude that this phrasing includes
motor vehicles.
Our conclusion is bolstered by the legislative commentary
to former AS 11.46.482 and 484 (criminal mischief in the second and
third degrees). These statutes defined the crime of "joyriding" in
the original version of the Criminal Code. [Fn. 1] In the
commentary to AS 11.46.482(a)(4), the legislature stated:
If it can be established that the defendant
acted with an intent to deprive the owner of the vehicle or to
appropriate the vehicle to himself, prosecution should be brought
under the Code's consolidated theft statute.
1978 Senate Journal, Supp. No. 47 (June 12), p. 51. This passage
demonstrates that the legislature intended the theft statutes to
cover the taking of a vehicle (if the government could prove that
the culprit acted with the required culpable mental state for
theft).
For these reasons, we conclude that motor vehicles can be
the subject of "theft" under AS 11.46.100.
Allridge presents an alternative argument. He asserts
that, even if the theft statutes do cover the takings of vehicles,
the crime of "vehicle theft" is a specific form of the more general
crime of "theft". Allridge thus concludes that only the vehicle
theft statute should apply to his conduct. He relies on the
doctrine that, when the legislature has enacted two statutes that
govern the same conduct or situation, one a general statute and the
other a more specific statute, the specific statute takes precedence
over the general. [Fn. 2]
The flaw in Allridge's argument is that "vehicle theft"
as defined in AS 11.46.360(a) is not the same thing as "theft" of
a motor vehicle as defined in AS 11.46.100.
Under AS 11.46.360(a), a person commits the crime of
first-degree vehicle theft if they "drive[], tow[] away, or take[]"
a motor vehicle when they have "no ... reasonable ground to believe
[that they have] ... a right [to do so]". This offense is a
recodified version of what is commonly called "joyriding" the
crime of taking a vehicle without permission, but not necessarily
with an intent to permanently deprive the owner or permanently
appropriate the vehicle for oneself. [Fn. 3] Theft, on the other
hand, requires proof of one or both of these culpable mental states
an intent to "appropriate" as defined in AS 11.46.990(2), or an
intent to "deprive" as defined in AS 11.46.990(8).
Moreover, as we recently noted, first-degree vehicle theft
appears to require proof of a trespassory taking. [Fn. 4] The crime
of theft, on the other hand, does not require a trespassory taking;
as codified in AS 11.46.100, "theft" includes instances of
embezzlement as well as instances in which property is willingly
delivered or relinquished to the thief because of mistake or
misrepresentation. It therefore appears possible to commit theft
of a motor vehicle without committing first-degree vehicle theft.
For instance, this could occur if the car thief "embezzled" the
vehicle that is, if the thief was a hired chauffeur or otherwise
had permission to take the vehicle and drive it.
We thus reject Allridge's argument that "vehicle theft"
is simply a special form of "theft" that applies to motor vehicles.
Rather, the two crimes are distinct; each crime requires proof of
elements that are not necessary to prove the other. First-degree
vehicle theft is essentially a recodification of the offense of
"joyriding"; the crime does not require proof of an intent to
deprive or an intent to appropriate. If the State can prove one or
both of these culpable mental states, then the defendant's conduct
constitutes theft. And, as explained above, the legislative
commentary to Alaska's former joyriding statutes plainly shows that
the legislature intended for a car thief to be convicted of theft
if the government could prove an intent to deprive or an intent to
appropriate.
The judgement of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1:
See SLA 1978, ch. 166, sec. 4.
Footnote 2:
See Sprague v. State, 590 P.2d 410, 415 n.14 (Alaska 1979).
Footnote 3:
See R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law (3rd edition 1982), pp.
333-34. See also Alaska Criminal Code Revision, Tentative Draft
(1977), Part 3, pp. 43-46.
Footnote 4:
See Eppenger v. State, Opinion No. 1609 (Alaska App., November
6, 1998), slip opinion at 8 (majority opinion) and at 9-10
(Mannheimer, J., concurring).
