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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
STATE OF ALASKA, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-6225
Petitioner, ) Trial Court No. 4FA-95-3316 Cr
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
ANTHONY LADD, )
)
Respondent. ) [No. 1570 - January 16, 1998]
______________________________)
Petition for Review from the Superior Court,
Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Niesje J. Steinkruger, Judge.
Appearances: Nancy R. Simel, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals,
Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for
Petitioner. Marcia E. Holland, Assistant Public Defender,
Fairbanks, and Barbara K. Brink, Public Defender, Anchorage, for
Respondent.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, Mannheimer, Judge,
and Joannides, District Court Judge.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
Under Alaska law before 1994, any person under the age
of 18 who was charged with a felony was prosecuted and (if found
guilty) punished under the juvenile delinquency laws contained in
Title 47, chapter 10 of the Alaska Statutes. In 1994, however, the
Alaska Legislature amended the coverage of the juvenile delinquency
laws by enacting former AS 47.10.010(e). Under this statute (from
1994 to 1996), and now under the successor statute, AS 47.12.030(a),
16- and 17-year-olds who are charged with certain serious felonies
are prosecuted as adults and, if found guilty, they are punished as
adults. [Fn. 1] The issue presented in this appeal is: how should
a court proceed when a 16- or 17-year-old is prosecuted (as an
adult) for one of the serious felonies listed in AS 47.12.030(a) but
is ultimately found guilty of some lesser offense?
Anthony Ladd, a 16-year-old, was charged with first-degree
assault, AS 11.41.200(a), for shooting another boy. Because first-
degree assault is a "crime against a person" and because it is a
class A felony, see AS 11.41.200(b), Ladd was prosecuted as an
adult. Following a jury trial, Ladd was acquitted of first-degree
assault but was convicted of a lesser offense, fourth-degree assault
(a misdemeanor). See AS 11.41.230(a) & (b).
In AS 47.12.030(a), the legislature has specified what it
wants a court to do in such cases. If "the minor is convicted of
some offense other than [the felonies listed] in this subsection",
the superior court is to give the minor an opportunity "to prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the minor is amenable to
treatment [as a juvenile]". A minor is considered "amenable to
treatment" as a juvenile "if the minor probably [can] be
rehabilitated by treatment under [AS 47.12] before reaching 20 years
of age." See AS 47.12.100(b). If the superior court finds that the
minor is amenable to treatment as a juvenile, "the court shall order
disposition of the charges ... under AS 47.12.120(b)". In other
words, if the minor proves that they are amenable to treatment, the
court will not sentence the minor as an adult but will instead
impose one or more of the juvenile dispositions listed in AS 47.12.-
120(b).
In Ladd's case, the superior court ruled that this
procedure is unconstitutional insofar as it places the burden of
persuasion on the minor. The court ruled that, because Ladd had
been convicted of only a lesser offense, Ladd must be deemed
presumptively amenable to juvenile treatment and that if the State
wanted Ladd to be sentenced as an adult, the State would have to
prove Ladd's unamenability to treatment by a preponderance of the
evidence.
The basic problem, as the superior court saw it, was that
minors convicted of the same crime were being treated differently
based on the district attorney's initial charging decision. Here
is the superior court's analysis:
If a 16- or 17-year-old is initially charged with a
misdemeanor or with a felony not listed in AS 47.12.030(a), the
minor is presumed to be amenable to treatment as a juvenile. If the
State wishes to prosecute and punish the minor as an adult, the
State must file a petition asking the superior court to waive its
juvenile jurisdiction over the minor. AS 47.12.100(a). When that
waiver petition is litigated, it is the State's burden to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the minor is not amenable to
juvenile treatment. AS 47.12.100(c).
On the other hand, if the 16- or 17-year-old is initially
charged with one of the felonies listed in AS 47.12.030(a), then
even if the minor is ultimately acquitted of the charged felony and
is convicted only of some lesser offense, the minor will
nevertheless presumptively be sentenced as an adult. That is,
because of the original charge, the minor will be presumed not to
be amenable to treatment as a juvenile. If the minor wishes to be
sentenced as a juvenile, it is the minor's burden to rebut this
presumption to show by a preponderance of the evidence that they
are amenable to treatment under the juvenile system.
The superior court concluded that the government's initial
charging decision was not a rational basis for this disparate
treatment. Therefore, the court ruled, minors who were initially
charged with greater offenses and who were later forced to shoulder
the burden of proof on the issue of amenability to treatment were
being denied the equal protection of the law guaranteed by Article
I, Section 1 of the Alaska Constitution.
The superior court's ruling is premised on two
interlocking assumptions. The court's first assumption is that, all
other things being equal, minors convicted of the same crime must
presumptively be deemed "similarly situated" for purposes of
disposition and, in particular, for purposes of deciding whether
the State or the minor should bear the burden of proof on the issue
of amenability to juvenile treatment. The court's second assumption
is that the legislature has classified some of these minors
differently (forcing them to shoulder the burden of proof on the
issue of amenability to treatment) based solely on the district
attorney's initial charging decision a decision that rests within
the unfettered discretion of the Department of Law. While we agree
with the superior court's first assumption, we conclude that the
court's second assumption is flawed.
Under the new juvenile legislation, the question of who
bears the burden of proof on the issue of amenability to treatment
does not depend solely upon the prosecutor's charging decision. As
explained below, even when the prosecutor charges a minor with one
of the serious felonies listed in AS 47.12.030(a), the burden of
proof on the issue of amenability to treatment does not shift to the
minor unless and until the State establishes probable cause to
believe that the minor has committed one of the felonies listed in
the statute.
Both former AS 47.10.010(e) and current AS 47.12.030(a)
declare that when a 16- or 17-year-old minor "is arraigned" on one
of the serious felonies listed in the statute, the delinquency
statutes and the Delinquency Rules do not apply to the prosecution,
the minor will be "charged, prosecuted, and sentenced in the
superior court in the same manner as an adult", and, if the minor
is found guilty of some lesser offense, the minor bears the burden
of proving their amenability to treatment as a juvenile. Thus, the
minor's arraignment is the event that triggers the consequences
detailed in the statute.
Under Alaska Criminal Rules 5(e) and 10(a), even though
a felony offender's initial appearance generally occurs in the
district court, and even though other preliminary proceedings may
occur in the district court, a felony defendant's "arraignment" does
not take place until the defendant is called upon to enter a plea
to the charge in the superior court. [Fn. 2] Before a defendant
can be arraigned on felony charges in the superior court, the State
must obtain a grand jury indictment (or the defendant must waive the
constitutional right to demand indictment). See Article I, Sec-
tion 8 of the Alaska Constitution and Criminal Rule 7(a)-(b).
Further, to obtain an indictment, the State must prove to the grand
jury "that the evidence ... establishe[s] a probability of [the
defendant's] guilt". See Criminal Rule 6(q), as interpreted in
Sheldon v. State, 796 P.2d 831, 837 (Alaska App. 1990).
While this standard, "probability of guilt", has not been
definitively equated with either "preponderance of the evidence" or
"probable cause", at the very least it means a showing of probable
cause. Therefore, even though the prosecutor decides what charges
to present to the grand jury, no minor can be arraigned on one of
the felonies listed in AS 47.12.030(a) unless and until the grand
jury finds that the State has demonstrated probable cause to believe
that the minor is guilty of that felony (or the minor specifically
waives the right to demand a showing of probable cause).
This showing of probable cause is the factor that provides
a plausible basis for the legislature's decision to make the minor
shoulder the burden of proving amenability to juvenile treatment if
the minor is convicted of some lesser offense. In essence, even
though two minors may be convicted of the same offense (a lesser
felony or a misdemeanor), it is rational for the legislature to
direct the superior court to treat the minors differently for
disposition purposes if there is probable cause to believe that one
of the minors has committed one of the serious felonies listed in
AS 47.12.030(a).
As explained above, a minor can not be arraigned in the
superior court on one of the serious felonies listed in
AS 47.12.030(a) until the grand jury has indicted the minor for that
crime, or until the minor has waived indictment. Thus, the burden-
shifting provision of AS 47.12.030(a) is not triggered until the
State has convinced the grand jury that there is at least probable
cause to believe that the minor committed the charged felony or
until, by waiving indictment, the minor has effectively conceded
that the State could establish the required probable cause at a
grand jury hearing.
Even if the State ultimately fails to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the minor committed the felony charged in the
indictment, and the minor is convicted of only a lesser offense, the
fact remains that there has been an independent determination of
probable cause to believe that the minor committed the more serious
crime. Thus, when the minor faces sentencing for the lesser
offense, and the superior court must decide whether the minor should
be subjected to a juvenile disposition or an adult disposition for
that lesser offense, it is reasonable to treat this minor
differently from other juvenile offenders whose conduct has never
provided reason to believe that they committed one of the serious
felonies listed in the statute.
We note that when the legislature changed the law relating
to minors older than 16, the legislature simultaneously codified the
same burden-shifting rule for younger minors (minors under the age
of 16) who are charged with serious felonies against a person.
Under the juvenile waiver statute former AS 47.10.060(f)(2) and
current AS 47.12.100(c)(2) when a minor under the age of 16 is
charged with an unclassified felony or a class A felony against a
person, and the State petitions the superior court to waive its
juvenile jurisdiction over the minor, the minor bears the burden of
proof on the issue of amenability to juvenile treatment once the
State demonstrates probable cause to believe that the minor has
committed the specified serious felony. [Fn. 3]
The ultimate question in this appeal is whether the
legislature violated the equal protection clause when it enacted
these different burdens of proof on the issue of amenability to
treatment. When adjudicating an equal protection claim under
Article I, Section 1 of the Alaska Constitution, the basic question
is whether similarly situated people are being treated the same.
Often (as in this case), it is clear that the legislature is
treating some people differently from others, and the court's real
task is to assess whether this different treatment is justifiable.
We must ask why the legislature chose to treat the two groups
differently, and whether there is in fact a relevant difference
between them. If so, then our next task is to examine how the
legislature's classification hurts the disadvantaged group of people
and to judge the significance of this legislated disadvantage. If
the legislature's action adversely affects important individual
rights, then the legislature's goal must be correspondingly
important, and the classification drawn by the statute must be
closely tailored to achieving that goal. Conversely, if the
legislation affects only lesser rights or interests, then the legis-
lation can rest on a lesser goal, and the means chosen to achieve
that goal can be less precise. Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v.
Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269-270 (Alaska 1984); George v. State, 944
P.2d 1181, 1186 (Alaska App. 1997).
We have concluded that, once the State demonstrates
probable cause to believe that a minor has committed one of the
serious felonies specified in AS 47.12.030(a), this showing of
probable cause provides a plausible criterion for distinguishing
between that minor and other minors who are ultimately convicted of
the same lesser offense. We must now apply the "sliding scale" test
for equal protection under the Alaska Constitution to see if this
factor sufficiently distinguishes the two groups of minors.
The first step is to identify the individual right that
has been impaired by the legislature's action, and to assess the
importance of that right. In the present case, the superior court
believed that the legislature's action (shifting the burden of proof
on the issue of amenability to juvenile treatment) impaired an
important right of 16- and 17-year-old minors: the right to be
treated more leniently than adults for violations of the criminal
law. Because the superior court believed that a minor's right to
juvenile treatment was a right "of high importance", the superior
court concluded that the challenged legislation had to be supported
by an equally weighty public justification.
Obviously, it makes a great deal of difference to a minor
whether the superior court can impose adult criminal penalties or
whether the court is limited, instead, to imposing a disposition
under the juvenile laws. However, people who break the law have
only a limited right to insist on the kind of penalty they will
face. In Anderson v. State, 904 P.2d 433 (Alaska App. 1995), the
defendant raised an equal protection challenge to the statute that
classified him as a third felony offender for presumptive sentencing
purposes. Even though Anderson claimed that the statute affected
one of the most basic constitutional interests the interest of
personal liberty we concluded that Anderson "[could] rightfully
complain of no more than an infringement of 'the relatively narrow
interest of a convicted offender in minimizing the punishment for
an offense'". Id., 904 P.2d at 436, quoting Maeckle v. State, 792
P.2d 686, 689 (Alaska App. 1990). The State, on the other hand,
"has a strong and direct interest in establishing penalties for
criminal offenders and in determining how those penalties should be
applied to various classes of convicted felons. In this arena, the
legislature has traditionally been afforded broad authority."
Anderson, 904 P.2d at 436, citing Dancer v. State, 715 P.2d 1174,
1180-81 (Alaska App. 1986).
More to the point in the present appeal, this court has
held that "[a] juvenile offender has no constitutional right to be
tried in a juvenile court." Rather, the privacy and the lesser
penalties of juvenile delinquency proceedings are "right[s] granted
by the state legislature, and the legislature may restrict or
qualify [those] right[s] as it desires, so long as no arbitrary or
discriminatory classification is involved." W.M.F. v. State, 723
P.2d 1298, 1300 (Alaska App. 1986), citing Woodard v. Wainwright,
556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977).
Accord, Hicks v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269, 274
(Cal. App. 1995) (a minor has no constitutional right to juvenile
treatment, nor a right to a presumption of amenability to juvenile
treatment); State in the Interest of A.L., 638 A.2d 814, 817 (N.J.
App. 1994) (the legislature can restrict or qualify a minor's right
to juvenile treatment so long as it "does not create an arbitrary
or discriminatory classification scheme"); Commonwealth v. Wayne W.,
606 N.E.2d 1323, 1326 (Mass. 1993) (a minor has no constitutional
right to juvenile treatment, but only a due process right to
"essential fairness" in the classification scheme); Novak v.
Commonwealth, 457 S.E.2d 402, 406-07 (Va. App. 1995) (rejecting an
equal protection challenge to a statute that provided automatic
waiver of juvenile jurisdiction for minors convicted of certain
serious felonies; the court held that the statute "identifies
certain violent crimes against the person as acts inconsistent with
the conduct of an offender amenable to treatment as a juvenile").
Thus, a minor does not have a protected "right" to
juvenile treatment. In deciding which minors should receive
juvenile delinquency dispositions for criminal acts, the legislature
can draw distinctions between different groups so long as those
distinctions are not arbitrary or based on a discriminatory
classification. W.M.F., supra.
There is a public interest in "rehabilitating wayward
youths" who are in fact "rehabilitatable in their youth". W.M.F.,
723 P.2d at 1300. On the other hand, society also has a significant
interest in utilizing adult criminal sanctions to "protect[] the
public from youths who [can not be] quickly rehabilitated", to
"provid[e] a longer period of rehabilitation for youths ... not so
quickly rehabilitated", to "show[] community condemnation for the
crimes committed [by such youths]", and to "deter[] the defendant
and others from committing the crimes in the future". Id.
It is important to remember that the statutory provision
challenged in the present appeal does not disqualify any minor from
being treated under the juvenile laws. Ladd and other minors like
him are not barred from receiving a juvenile disposition for their
criminal acts. Rather, the challenged provision merely declares
that, when the superior court decides whether to impose an adult
disposition or a juvenile disposition, the minor bears the burden
of proof on this issue.
When the law allocates a "preponderance of the evidence"
burden of proof to a party, the effect is to make that party bear
the risk that the evidence will be inconclusive insufficient to
persuade the trier of fact that either party is correct. See United
Bank Alaska v. Dischner, 685 P.2d 90, 93 (Alaska 1984) (the party
bearing the burden of proof "bears the risk of losing if the trier
of fact is not persuaded"); see also W.M.F., 723 P.2d at 1301 (the
burden of proof "allocat[es] the risk of error"). Basically, the
challenged portion of AS 47.12.030(a) constitutes a legislative
directive to the superior court: in close cases, when the evidence
yields no answer to the question of whether the minor can be
rehabilitated within the juvenile system by age 20, the legislature
wants the minor to receive an adult penalty.
There is a reasonably close fit between the legislature's
purpose and the means the legislature has employed to effect that
purpose. In cases where the evidence does not disclose whether a
minor can be rehabilitated under the juvenile system by age 20, it
is reasonable for the legislature to make the decision turn on
whether the State has previously established probable cause to
believe that the minor has committed one of the serious felonies
listed in AS 47.12.030(a). This indication of dangerousness is
reasonably related to the criteria for deciding whether a minor
should be dealt with under the juvenile system or the adult system.
See State v. Morales, 694 A.2d 758, 764-65 (Conn. 1997), and State
v. Matos, 694 A.2d 775, 784, 786-87 (Conn. 1997) (holding that there
is a reasonable basis for the legislature's decision to deny
juvenile treatment to a minor charged with murder following a
probable cause hearing, even though the minor is ultimately
convicted only of manslaughter).
We therefore conclude that the burden-shifting provisions
of former AS 47.10.010(e) and current AS 47.12.030(a) do not violate
the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution. The
decision of the superior court is REVERSED.
FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1:
AS 47.12.030(a) provides:
When a minor who was at least 16 years of age at the
time of the offense is arraigned on a charge for an offense
specified in this subsection, this chapter and the Alaska
Delinquency Rules do not apply to the offense for which the minor
is arraigned or to any additional offenses joinable to it under the
applicable rules of court governing criminal procedure. The minor
shall be charged, prosecuted, and sentenced in the superior court
in the same manner as an adult unless the minor is convicted of some
offense other than an offense specified in this subsection, in which
event the minor may attempt to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the minor is amenable to treatment under this
chapter. If the court finds that the minor is amenable to treatment
under this chapter, the minor shall be treated as though the charges
had been heard under this chapter, and the court shall order
disposition of the charges of which the minor is convicted under AS
47.12.120(b). The provisions of this subsection apply when the
minor is arraigned on a charge
(1) that is an unclassified felony or a class A
felony and the felony is a crime against a person; or
(2) of arson in the first degree.
Footnote 2:
Criminal Rule 10(a) states that an "[a]rraignment ... shall
consist of reading the indictment or information to the defendant
or stating to the defendant the substance of the charge[,] and
calling on the defendant to plead thereto." Criminal Rule 5(e)
states that "[i]f the charge against a defendant is a felony, the
defendant shall not be called upon to plead" to the charge in the
district court. That is, the arraignment does not occur until the
defendant appears in the superior court and is asked to enter a
plea.
Footnote 3:
AS 47.12.100(c)(2) provides that, when the State petitions
for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction,
the burden of proof that a minor is not amenable to
treatment under this chapter is on the state; however, if the
[waiver] petition ... is based on the minor's alleged commission of
an offense that is an unclassified felony or class A felony and
that is a crime against a person, the minor
(A) is rebuttably presumed not to be amenable to
treatment under this chapter; and
(B) has the burden of proof of showing that the minor
is amenable to treatment under this chapter.
Comparable language was found in former AS 47.10.060(f)(2).
Thus, even when a minor is younger than 16 and will presump-
tively be prosecuted under the juvenile system for any crime, if the
State files a waiver petition and establishes probable cause to
believe that the minor has committed one of the serious felonies
listed in the statute, the burden of proof on the issue of
amenability to juvenile treatment falls to the minor. That is, for
a minor of any age, the burden of proof on the issue of amenability
to juvenile treatment will be allocated based on the crime that the
minor is alleged to have committed, once the State establishes that
the allegation is supported by probable cause.
