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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
WILLIAM ARTHUR SAKEAGAK, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-6293
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 2BA-95-316 Cr
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 1568 - January 9, 1998]
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Second Judicial
District, Barrow, Michael I. Jeffery, Judge.
Appearances: Rebecca K. Wright, Assistant
Public Defender, Barrow, and Barbara K. Brink, Public Defender,
Anchorage, for Appellant. Nancy R. Simel, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and
Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and
Stewart, Judges.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
William Arthur Sakeagak was convicted of first-degree
murder, AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A), and sentenced to 99 years' imprison-
ment. He appeals his conviction, arguing that three of the trial
judge's evidentiary rulings were mistaken. Sakeagak also appeals
his sentence; he argues that the judge was mistaken in finding that
the victim was particularly vulnerable, and he further asserts that
his 99-year sentence is excessive. We affirm.
At approximately 9:20 p.m. on Sunday, October 22, 1995,
North Slope Borough police officers arrived at Quonset Hut 267A at
the Naval Arctic Research Laboratory (NARL) outside of Barrow. They
came to investigate the report of a possible death. The officers
arrived to find Sakeagak kneeling over the body of his wife, Judy.
It was evident to the officers that Judy Sakeagak was
dead. Rigor mortis had begun to set in, and the extremities of Ms.
Sakeagak's body were already cool to the touch (although the body
core was still warm).
William Sakeagak's breath smelled of alcoholic beverages,
but he was responsive to questions and seemed to be in control of
his faculties. Sakeagak told the officers that he had left home
around 7:15 that evening (that is, approximately two hours before),
and that Judy had been alive, sitting in the living room, when he
left. According to Sakeagak, he returned home at 9:15 (just a few
minutes before the officers arrived) and discovered his wife
collapsed in the bedroom.
Sakeagak told the officers that, a week before, his wife
had begun to suffer a heart condition. The officers noticed that
there were several bloodstains in the bedroom, in the bathroom, and
on Sakeagak's clothes. When asked about these bloodstains, Sakeagak
first said that he didn't know where the blood had come from; later,
he said that his wife had been suffering spontaneous nosebleeds.
As just explained, when Sakeagak was asked to describe his
movements that Sunday evening, Sakeagak said that he had left his
house around 7:15 and had returned around 9:15. Sakeagak told the
officers that, during these two hours, he first visited the
Recreational Center at NARL and then he took a bus into Barrow,
where he went to a store and purchased soda and cigarettes. He then
returned home.
The police later discovered that Sakeagak's account of his
whereabouts did not match the bus schedule. On Sunday evenings,
only two buses departed Barrow for NARL; one left at 5:40 p.m. and
the other left at 9:40 p.m.. The bus trip takes 15 minutes: that
is, the earlier bus arrived at NARL at 5:55, while the later bus
arrived at 9:55. If the buses were on time that evening, Sakeagak
could not have taken the bus from Barrow and returned to NARL
shortly after 9:00 as he claimed. Moreover, the police also found
out that the NARL Recreational Center was closed on Sundays.
The medical examiner conducted an autopsy and concluded
that Judy Sakeagak had died as a result of manual strangulation.
Given the condition of the body when it was discovered, the medical
examiner concluded that Judy Sakeagak had probably been dead for
several hours when the officers arrived (at 9:20 p.m.). This
information cast doubt on Sakeagak's claim that his wife had been
alive when he left the house at around 7:15 that evening.
Upon receipt of the autopsy report, Sergeant Venable (one
of the investigating officers) re-interviewed Sakeagak. During this
second interview, Venable told Sakeagak that it appeared Judy did
not die of natural causes, and that Sakeagak was responsible for her
death. However, Venable did not tell Sakeagak that the medical
examiner had concluded that Judy was strangled. Sakeagak eventually
told Venable that he and Judy had fought on the evening of her
death. Sakeagak said that, while he was pushing his wife down onto
the bed, he had pulled on her arm while the arm was wrapped around
her neck suggesting that Judy had strangled by accident. At the
ensuing trial, the medical examiner testified that he thought this
explanation of the death was highly dubious that it was
essentially impossible for "a healthy person to put their own arm
around their neck in a way that could cause them to become injured."
A Barrow jury convicted Sakeagak of first-degree murder.
Superior Court Judge Michael I. Jeffery sentenced Sakeagak to
99 years' imprisonment.
The Evidentiary Rulings
At trial, during the government's direct examination of
Sgt. Venable, the prosecutor played a tape recording of Venable's
interview with Sakeagak (the one that took place after Venable
received the medical examiner's report). Before the prosecutor
played the tape for the jury, the following exchange occurred:
PROSECUTOR: Investigator Venable, I'm
going to play this whole tape for the jury, but before we listen to
it, I want to give the jury a "heads up" on how the interview was
conducted. Could you explain how the interview was conducted?
VENABLE: Yes, sir. I brought Mr. Sakea-
gak ... to the office. The first thing that I
did was tell him that Judy was killed and it wasn't it wasn't
natural causes. The second thing I informed him of is the fact that
that he was responsible for the death.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. And basically,
throughout that interview, you confronted him
with those kinds of statements.
VENABLE: Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. And why did you
[conduct] this interview as such a confrontational interview?
VENABLE: Because I felt that he was
responsible for her death.
Defense counsel objected to Venable's last answer, as well as to the
playing of the parts of the taped interview where Venable told
Sakeagak (falsely) that the medical examiner had concluded that
Sakeagak was responsible for his wife's death.
Judge Jeffery concluded that Venable's in-court answer was
admissible to show why the officer had "adopted that particular
investigative style" during the interview. As for Venable's false
assertions to Sakeagak during the taped interview that the medical
examiner had concluded that Sakeagak was responsible for his wife's
death, Judge Jeffery allowed Sakeagak's attorney to conduct a voir
dire examination of Venable (in the presence of the jury) before the
tape was played. During this voir dire, Venable conceded that these
statements to Sakeagak were simply part of his interview strategy,
and that the medical examiner had not identified Sakeagak (or any
other individual) as being responsible for Judy Sakeagak's death.
On appeal, Sakeagak contends that Judge Jeffery's ruling
essentially allowed Venable to inform the jury of his personal
opinion that Sakeagak was guilty. Relying on Flynn v. State, 847
P.2d 1073 (Alaska App. 1993), Sakeagak argues that this testimony
deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree.
There was no chance that the jury would misapprehend the
import of the statements Venable made during the taped interview
concerning the autopsy results (his assertions to Sakeagak that the
medical examiner had identified Sakeagak as the person responsible
for his wife's death). When the defense attorney conducted the voir
dire examination of Venable before the tape was played, Venable
readily conceded that these assertions were false that the medical
examiner had not identified any individual as being responsible for
Judy Sakeagak's death. Venable explained that he told this lie to
Sakeagak in order to prompt him to confess.
Regarding Venable's answer, "I felt that he [Sakeagak] was
responsible for her death", the admissibility of this testimony is
more debatable. The issue is one of weighing probative force
against potential for unfair prejudice under Evidence Rule 403.
As the prosecutor suggested, and as Judge Jeffery ruled,
Venable's opinion that Sakeagak had probably killed his wife does
tend to explain the confrontational tone that Venable adopted during
the interview. However, Venable's interview strategy was not the
subject of major dispute at trial; Sakeagak did not assert that he
was confused or coerced by the confrontational style that Venable
adopted during the interview. Although Venable's suspicions of
Sakeagak's guilt may have been relevant to explaining his interview
strategy, see Evidence Rule 401, Venable's choice of interview
strategy had little importance to the decision of Sakeagak's case.
The remaining term of the equation is the potential of
Venable's testimony to create unfair prejudice. In Flynn, 847 P.2d
at 1075-76, and in Thompson v. State, 769 P.2d 997, 1003-04 (Alaska
App. 1989), this court recognized and applied the rule that
witnesses are not allowed to give their personal opinions of the
defendant's guilt or innocence. In Flynn, we recognized the
particular danger of allowing police officers to give their opinion
that the defendant is guilty. True, jurors are generally instructed
that they are not bound by the testimony of any witness, and that
they are obliged to decide the case for themselves. Nevertheless,
jurors may surmise that the police are privy to more facts than have
been presented in court, or they may be improperly swayed by the
opinion of a witness who is presented as an experienced criminal
investigator.
Under the facts of this case, however, the risk was small
that Venable's answer would prejudice the fairness of Sakeagak's
trial. Unlike the police officer in Flynn (who told the jury that
he had never seen an innocent person confess), Venable did not
purport to be a "human polygraph". Venable merely testified that,
when he went to interview Sakeagak the second time, he believed that
Sakeagak was responsible for his wife's death.
The evidence at trial showed that, at the time of that
second interview, Venable was aware of the autopsy results (which
revealed that Judy Sakeagak had been strangled), and Venable was
also aware that Sakeagak's account of his movements and actions on
the evening of his wife's death was almost certainly false. In view
of this evidence, it is quite unlikely that the jury was left
wondering about the basis of Venable's suspicions.
As in Walker v. State, 674 P.2d 825, 831-32 (Alaska App.
1983), we conclude that Venable's explicit statement added nothing
of substance to an inference the jury could easily draw for
themselves. "[T]he basis for [Venable's] conclusion and the
possible lack of evidence to support that conclusion [were] before
the jury". Id. at 832. Because the testimony had some relevance,
and because the potential for unfair prejudice was negligible, we
conclude that Judge Jeffery did not abuse his discretion when he
overruled Sakeagak's objection to this testimony. Hawley v. State,
614 P.2d 1349, 1361 (Alaska 1980).
Sakeagak next contends that Judge Jeffery should not have
allowed the State to introduce certain statements that Sakeagak made
concerning his wife's purported premonitions of death and the
preparations she purportedly made for her own funeral.
At trial, the State presented evidence that, a few days
after Judy Sakeagak's death, Sakeagak had a conversation with a
family friend, Ransom Agnassaga. Sakeagak told Agnassaga that Judy
had been having chest pains for some time. He also told Agnassaga
that, during the week before her death, Judy had had premonitions
of death: she had selected the Bible verses to be read at her
funeral, and she had purchased the dress in which she wished to be
buried.
Sometime after this conversation, Agnassaga and his wife
went to Sakeagak's house to pick up the funeral dress. However,
when Sakeagak showed them the dress, Agnassaga and his wife
recognized that the dress was not newly-purchased: it was the dress
that Judy had worn to the Agnassagas' wedding five years before.
Sakeagak's attorney objected that this testimony was
purely character evidence, and therefore unfairly prejudicial,
because its only relevance was to suggest that Sakeagak was a liar.
The prosecutor responded that Sakeagak's lies demonstrated his
consciousness of guilt. Judge Jeffery ruled that the probative
value of the testimony outweighed its potential prejudicial effect.
The defense attorney refused Judge Jeffery's offer to give the jury
a limiting instruction; the attorney asserted that the prejudicial
effect of the testimony could not be cured.
On appeal, Sakeagak concedes that he lied to Agnassaga,
but he argues that evidence of his lies should have been excluded
because it was not relevant, and because its only effect was to show
that Sakeagak was a person of bad character a liar who perhaps
did not take his wife's death seriously. We disagree.
If evidence of Sakeagak's lies had been offered simply to
show that Sakeagak was a person of questionable character, the
evidence would have been inadmissible. See Alaska Evidence Rules
404(a) and 404(b). However, this was not the case. Sakeagak's
false statements to Agnassaga were relevant because, potentially,
they showed that Sakeagak was consciously attempting to mislead
Agnassaga about Judy's death attempting to falsely portray her
death as the result of pre-existing illness or physical condition.
From such deliberate falsehoods, the jury could infer that Sakeagak
was conscious of his own guilt. Additionally, such lies were
evidence that Sakeagak had acted with the culpable mental state
required for first-degree murder.
Sakeagak suggests that there might be other explanations
for Sakeagak's decision to lie about what his wife did and said in
the days preceding her death. In particular, Sakeagak suggests that
his statements might have been the product of extreme grief, an
attempt to cope with the recent loss of a loved one. However, the
fact that there are other plausible interpretations of the evidence
does not negate the relevance of that evidence to evince Sakeagak's
consciousness of guilt. Sakeagak's arguments go to the weight of
the evidence a determination for the jury rather than its
relevance. See Charles v. State, 780 P.2d 377, 383 (Alaska App.
1989); Dyer v. State, 666 P.2d 438, 449 (Alaska App. 1983); Elson
v. State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1201 (Alaska 1983) (when a defendant's
conduct can reasonably be interpreted as inculpatory, alternative
explanations of the defendant's conduct "go to the weight rather
than the admissibility of the evidence"). See also United States
v. Newman, 6 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a
defendant's false exculpatory statements were circumstantial
evidence of the defendant's consciousness of guilt).
When Sakeagak objected to this evidence, Judge Jeffery
complied with the mandate of Evidence Rule 403 by weighing the
potential prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative
value. The judge determined that this evidence was relevant for
purposes other than to show Sakeagak's character, and that it was
more probative than prejudicial. Sakeagak has failed to convince
us that this ruling was an abuse of discretion.
The Sentencing Issues
We now turn to Sakeagak's sentencing issues. Sakeagak was
found guilty of first-degree murder. The presumptive sentencing
laws do not apply to first-degree murder; a sentencing judge has the
authority to impose any sentence within the range of imprisonment
for this offense (20 years to 99 years). AS 12.55.125(a). However,
even though the aggravating and mitigating factors codified in
AS 12.55.155(c) and (d) do not apply to first-degree murder, the
parties used these factors as points of reference at Sakeagak's
sentencing when they argued how Sakeagak's offense should be viewed
in comparison to a typical first-degree murder. We have approved
this practice in similar circumstances. See Gregory v. State, 689
P.2d 508, 509 (Alaska App. 1984) (approving a judge's consideration
of the statutory aggravators and mitigators in a second-degree
murder sentencing).
The State argued that Sakeagak's offense should be deemed
more than typically serious because Sakeagak knew that Judy Sakeagak
was quite intoxicated at the time of her death, and thus
particularly vulnerable to Sakeagak's assault. (Judy's blood-
alcohol level at the time of her death was .249 percent.) See
AS 12.55.155(c)(5), which declares that an offense is aggravated if
"the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim
of the offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of
resistance due to advanced age, disability, ill health, or extreme
youth[,] or was for any other reason substantially incapable of
exercising normal physical or mental powers of resistance". Judge
Jeffery agreed with the State that this factor was present in
Sakeagak's case.
Sakeagak argues that aggravator (c)(5) does not apply to
victims who are rendered particularly vulnerable by intoxication.
He relies on AS 12.55.155(g), which declares, "Voluntary alcohol or
other drug intoxication ... may not be considered an aggravating or
mitigating factor." When Sakeagak presented this argument to Judge
Jeffery, the judge concluded that AS 12.55.155(g) was intended to
bar a sentencing judge from finding aggravators or mitigators based
on the defendant's intoxication, but that AS 12.55.155(g) was not
intended to bar a judge from considering a victim's intoxication
when determining the disabilities described in AS 12.55.155(c)(5).
We agree.
While the wording of AS 12.55.155(g), considered by
itself, might support Sakeagak's argument, we must interpret the
various parts of AS 12.55.155 as a whole. The guiding principle of
statutory construction is to ascertain and implement the intent of
the legislature. When a statutory provision is part of a larger
framework, even seemingly unambiguous language must be interpreted
in the context of the other portions of the statute. Millman v.
State, 841 P.2d 190, 194 (Alaska App. 1992).
AS 12.55.155(c)(5) authorizes increased sentences for
defendants whose victims are "for any ... reason substantially
incapable of exercising normal physical or mental powers of
resistance". The statute specifically mentions victims whose
incapacity is due to ill health, and this court has interpreted the
statute to apply to victims who are substantially incapable of
resistance because they are asleep. See Wassillie v. State, 911
P.2d 1071, 1073 (Alaska App. 1996). Given the obvious legislative
policy behind aggravator (c)(5), it is simply unreasonable to
interpret aggravator (c)(5) as not authorizing increased sentences
for defendants whose victims are substantially incapacitated by
intoxication. Sakeagak offers no plausible reason why the legisla-
ture might have wanted to limit the scope of aggravator (c)(5) in
the manner he suggests.
Sakeagak's final contention is that his 99-year sentence
is excessive. This is the maximum sentence for first-degree murder,
and Sakeagak relies on cases holding that "maximum sentences ...
should not be imposed without some foundation for characterizing a
defendant as the worst type of offender." State v. Wortham, 537
P.2d 1117, 1120 (Alaska 1975), quoting Galaktionoff v. State, 486
P.2d 919, 924 (Alaska 1971).
However, a finding that a defendant is a "worst offender"
can be based on the nature and circumstances of the defendant's
present offense, or on the defendant's criminal history, or both.
Hintz v. State, 627 P.2d 207, 210 (Alaska 1981); Moore v. State, 597
P.2d 975, 976 n.4 (Alaska 1979); Saganna v. State, 594 P.2d 69, 70
(Alaska 1979). This court's decision in Riley v. State, 720 P.2d
951 (Alaska App. 1986), strongly suggests that a defendant who
commits first-degree murder is often, by virtue of the crime alone,
properly categorized as a "worst offender". In Riley, this court
rejected a proposed 60-year benchmark sentence for first-degree
murder primarily because 99-year sentences for first-degree murder
have consistently been upheld by the Alaska appellate courts. Id.,
720 P.2d at 952.
Riley does not establish the rule that first-degree
murderers can always receive 99-year sentences, nor does Riley free
sentencing judges from the obligation to base sentences on a careful
consideration of the Chaney sentencing criteria. See Riley, 720
P.2d at 952; State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Alaska 1970);
AS 12.55.005. However, after Riley, a defendant who challenges a
99-year sentence for first-degree murder must show some reason to
believe that his offense is mitigated or that his background is
atypically favorable.
Judge Jeffery found that Sakeagak's case presented three
of the aggravating factors listed in AS 12.55.155(c): (c)(5) (that
Sakeagak knew or reasonably should have known that his victim was
particularly vulnerable), (c)(8) (that Sakeagak had a history of
assaultive conduct), and (c)(18)(A) (that Sakeagak's crime was
committed against a person living in the same household). The judge
also noted that Sakeagak's murder of his wife had been the
culmination of a "continuum of domestic violence". Sakeagak had a
lengthy history of assaults upon his wife. Most of these assaults
were not prosecuted, but one incident (in which Sakeagak slammed his
wife's head against a door and then cut her arm with a hunting
knife) led to Sakeagak's conviction in 1992 for fourth-degree
assault. [Fn. 1]
Judge Jeffery concluded that, in fashioning Sakeagak's
sentence, he needed to stress the community's condemnation of
domestic violence. The judge concluded that Sakeagak had little
insight into his criminal behavior and that there was a substantial
danger that Sakeagak would resort to similar violence in any future
relationship. Judge Jeffery also noted that Sakeagak had a serious
and long-standing alcohol problem, a problem that Sakeagak had
failed to address despite several past opportunities.
Sakeagak does not seriously dispute any of this. He does
argue, however, that despite these aggravating circumstances there
is "nothing in the record" to indicate that he intended to kill his
wife when he assaulted her. The jury found otherwise; they
convicted Sakeagak of first-degree murder, which requires a finding
that Sakeagak intended to kill his wife. The record contains ample
evidence to support this finding.
Sakeagak argues that his crime is less aggravated than
some of the other first-degree murders that have been reviewed on
appeal. This is true. However, as explained above, a 99-year
sentence for first-degree murder will generally be upheld unless a
defendant shows that their offense is mitigated or that their
background is unusually favorable. Sakeagak has shown neither.
Judge Jeffery found that Sakeagak's murder of his wife was
aggravated in two aspects: first, because it was an instance of
domestic violence; and second, because Sakeagak knew that his wife
was particularly vulnerable due to her intoxication. In addition,
Sakeagak's long-standing problem with alcohol and his prior assaults
on his wife both support a finding that Sakeagak's background is
unfavorable. For these reasons, we conclude that Sakeagak's 99-year
sentence is not clearly mistaken. McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811,
813-14 (Alaska 1974).
Conclusion
The judgement of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1:
Sakeagak also had a lengthy history of misdemeanor
convictions. These convictions included: driving while intoxicated
in 1985; third-degree theft and third-degree criminal mischief in
1988; another driving while intoxicated in 1990; a third driving
while intoxicated in 1992; and a second third-degree theft and a
fourth driving while intoxicated in 1994.
