State of Alaska v. District Court (12/6/96) ap-1504
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
STATE OF ALASKA, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-6022
Petitioner, ) Trial Court Nos. 1KE-95-6437 Cr
) and others
v. )
) O P I N I O N
DISTRICT COURT, )
)
Respondent. ) [No. 1504 - December 6, 1996]
______________________________)
Original Application for Relief from the
District Court in various locations within the
First and Third Judicial Districts; Patricia A.
Collins, Judge, and Deborah Burlinski, Lynn
Christensen, Anna Moran, and Ethan Windahl,
Magistrates.
Appearances: Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecu-
tions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Bruce M.
Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for
Petitioner. Nancy Shaw, Anchorage, for
Respondent.
Before: Bryner, Chief Judge, and Coats and
Mannheimer, Judges.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
With a few exceptions not relevant here, Alaska law
forbids people under the age of 21 from drinking or possessing
alcoholic beverages. AS 4.16.050(a). If a person between the ages
of 13 and 17 is convicted of this offense, the sentencing court must
revoke their driver's license (or revoke their privilege to obtain
a license, if they do not yet have one). AS 28.15.185(a)-(b). The
question presented in this appeal is whether, because the offense
carries this penalty, minors charged with under-age drinking or
possession of alcohol are entitled to a jury trial and to court-
appointed counsel if they are indigent. Based on our supreme
court's decision in Baker v. Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970),
we hold that minors charged with this offense are entitled to a jury
trial and to court-appointed counsel.
In Baker, the supreme court defined the categories of
cases that qualify as "criminal prosecutions" for purposes of
applying the right to jury trial under Article I, Section 11 of the
Alaska Constitution. (EN1) The court stated, in pertinent part:
In extending the right to jury trial, we
define the category of "criminal" prosecutions
as including any offense [which carries] a
direct penalty [of] incarceration in a jail or
penal institution. [This category] also
includes offenses which may result in the loss
of a valuable license, such as a driver's
license or a license to pursue a common
calling, occupation, or business.
Baker, 471 P.2d at 402. Thus, Baker apparently requires a jury
trial in any criminal case in which the defendant could lose their
driver's license.
The State argues that Baker should not be interpreted
literally. The State points out that the supreme court has
repeatedly held that there is no right to a jury trial in
administrative hearings which might result in loss of a valuable
license. See Alaska Board of Fish and Game v. Loesche, 537 P.2d
1122, 1125 (Alaska 1975) (loss of license to guide hunts); In re
Cornelius, 520 P.2d 76, 83 (Alaska 1974) (loss of license to
practice law). However, Loesche and Cornelius dealt with admini-
strative proceedings conducted by regulatory bodies. The task of
those regulatory bodies is to oversee and police a particular
business or occupation, not to enforce the criminal law. Even when
a regulatory agency takes administrative action based on a
licensee's commission of a crime, this is not a "prosecution". The
licensee can still be criminally prosecuted in the courts for the
same conduct. State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska App. 1995).
We note that the Alaska statutes require the Department
of Public Safety to take administrative action against the driver's
license of a minor found drinking or possessing liquor. See
AS 28.15.183-184. These provisions are, on their face, remedial
measures. However, in the present appeal we are dealing with a
different statute, AS 28.15.185. This statute is clearly a punitive
measure: it specifies a particular punishment that a sentencing
court must impose when, in court proceedings, a person is found
guilty of a particular criminal offense.
The State argues that it makes essentially no difference
whether a person's driver's license is taken by a sentencing court
or by an administrative agency. According to the State, the
rationale for imposing this sanction is the same: the minor has
demonstrated unfitness to drive. Thus, the State contends, the act
of revoking the minor's driver's license is "remedial", not
"punitive", regardless of whether the revocation is imposed by a
sentencing court or by the Department of Public Safety.
We reject the State's argument because the supreme court's
holding in Baker is explicitly based on the distinction between loss
of a driver's license in an administrative proceeding and loss of
a license as part of a criminal sentence. The court expressly
stated that the right to a jury trial would apply only to criminal
prosecutions, not to administrative proceedings, even though both
might result in the loss of a driver's license. The court
distinguished administrative proceedings from criminal prosecutions
because an agency's action against a license is based on "criteria
other than criminality", on "considerations [apart from] guilt or
innocence of crime". Baker, 471 P.2d at 402 n.28.
In the present appeal, we deal with a statute that comes
into play only when, and solely because, a person has been found
guilty of violating a criminal statute. Baker holds that a person
facing the loss of a valuable license under such a statute is
entitled to a jury trial.
We therefore AFFIRM the decisions of the district court
extending the right of-age drinking or possession of alcohol. And,
based on the same analysis, we AFFIRM the decisions of the district
court requiring court-appointed counsel for indigents accused of
this crime. See Alexander v. Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910, 913 (Alaska
1971) (holding that the right to counsel extends to all "criminal
prosecutions" as defined in Baker).
ENDNOTES:
1. Article I, Section 11 provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to ... trial ... by
an impartial jury of twelve, except that the legislature may
provide for a jury of not more than twelve nor less than six in
courts not of record." (That is, in the district court.)
