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THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
ANTHONY J. MANCINI, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-5538
Appellant, ) Trial Court Nos. 1JU-93-1748CI,
) 1JU-S90-571CR, & 1JU-S90-1486CR
v. )
) O P I N I O N
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 1442 - October 6, 1995]
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court, First
Judicial District, Juneau, Walter L.
Carpeneti, Judge.
Appearances: Monte L. Brice, Brice &
Associates, Juneau, for Appellant. Kenneth
M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals,
Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney
General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Judge, Coats and
Mannheimer, Judges.
BRYNER, Chief Judge.
Anthony J. Mancini entered pleas of no contest to, and
was convicted of, one count of theft in the second degree, a
class C felony, and one count of sexual abuse of a minor in the
second degree, a class B felony. AS 11.46.130(a)(1); AS
11.41.436(a)(2). Based in part on a 1978 California conviction
for burglary, Mancini conceded that he had two prior felony
convictions for presumptive sentencing purposes. Superior Court
Judge Walter L. Carpeneti relied on the concession and sentenced
Mancini to consecutive terms totalling ten years with one year
suspended. On appeal, this court concluded that Judge Carpeneti
had improperly found an aggravating factor in imposing Mancini's
sentence; we remanded for resentencing. Mancini v. State, 841
P.2d 184 (Alaska App. 1992). On remand, Judge Carpeneti, again
relying on the 1978 burglary conviction for purposes of finding
two prior felony convictions, resentenced Mancini to a composite
term of nine and one-half years with one year suspended.
Mancini thereafter filed an application for post-
conviction relief, alleging that his 1978 California burglary
conviction should not have counted as a prior conviction for
sentencing purposes. Mancini pointed out that under California's
sentence enhancement laws, because the 1978 burglary conviction
had resulted in his commitment to the California Youth Authority
(CYA), it would not have qualified as a prior conviction for
purposes of enhancing his sentence for a new California offense.
Mancini argued that, because California would not treat the
conviction as a prior conviction for sentence enhancement
purposes, neither should Alaska.
Judge Carpeneti, finding Alaska -- not California --
law controlling, determined that Mancini's 1978 burglary
conviction qualified as a prior conviction under Alaska's
presumptive sentencing statute. Accordingly, Judge Carpeneti
rejected Mancini's argument and denied his application for post-
conviction relief. Mancini now appeals, contending that Judge
Carpeneti erred in finding California law inapplicable. We find
Mancini's argument unpersuasive and affirm.1
In 1978, when Mancini was eighteen years of age, he
committed a burglary in California; he was convicted as an adult
by the Los Angeles Superior Court.2 Subject to certain
exceptions not pertinent here, California law permits youthful
offenders who are under twenty-one years of age to be committed
to the CYA; commitment is allowed regardless of whether the
offender has been convicted as an adult or adjudicated by the
juvenile court as a delinquent. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code '
1731.5. Although Mancini was eighteen years of age when he
committed the 1978 offense, and was therefore an adult, he
qualified for treatment as a youthful adult offender and was
committed to the CYA.
Under California law, a youthful offender convicted as
an adult and committed to the CYA is deemed to have been
convicted of a crime. See People v. Pride, 833 P.2d 643, 680-81
(Cal. 1992); People v. Navarro, 497 P.2d 481, 495, 497 (Cal.
1972). Nevertheless, the California statute that provides for
enhancement of criminal sentences based on prior convictions
prohibits enhancement "for any [prior] felony for which the
defendant did not serve a prior separate term in state prison."
Cal. Pen. Code ' 667.5(e). Because commitment to the CYA is not
considered a "term in state prison," California courts have ruled
that adult convictions resulting in CYA commitment cannot serve
as a basis for sentence enhancement under ' 667.5(e). See People
v. Seals, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676 (Cal. App. 1993); People v.
Redman, 178 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52 (Cal. App. 1981). But see People
v. Shields, 279 Cal. Rptr. 403, 405 (Cal. App. 1991).
Mancini insists that California law should determine
whether his 1978 burglary amounts to a prior conviction for
sentence enhancement purposes under Alaska's presumptive
sentencing legislation. But he is incorrect. The issue is
instead controlled by AS 12.55.145(a)(2), which provides that "a
conviction in this or another jurisdiction of an offense having
elements similar to those of a felony defined as such under
Alaska law at the time the offense was committed is considered a
prior felony conviction."
Insofar as this provision addresses out-of-state
adjudications, it sets forth two prerequisites to the finding of
a prior felony conviction for presumptive sentencing purposes:
first, there must be "a conviction in . . . another
jurisdiction;" and, second, that conviction must involve "an
offense having elements similar to those of a felony defined as
such under Alaska law."
While we have previously had occasion to interpret the
second of these prerequisites, see, e.g., Borja v. State, 886
P.2d 1311 (Alaska App. 1994), Wells v. State, 687 P.2d 346
(Alaska App. 1984), we have never expressly considered the first.
We agree with Mancini that California law must govern the first
prerequisite -- that is, the issue of whether Mancini has "a
conviction in . . . another jurisdiction." As we have seen,
however, California law clearly regards Mancini's 1978 judgment
of commitment to the CYA as a criminal conviction. Pride, 833
P.2d at 680-81; Navarro, 497 P.2d at 495, 497. Since Mancini
does not dispute that the 1978 California burglary involved
"elements similar to those of a felony defined as such under
Alaska law," it follows that both prerequisites to the finding of
a prior felony conviction have been met under AS 12.45.145(a)(2).
Although we agree with Mancini that California law must
determine whether he has "a conviction in . . . another
jurisdiction," we disagree with his further assertion that
California law must be relied on to determine the effect of that
conviction on his sentence for a new crime committed in Alaska.
The effect of a prior criminal conviction -- whether an Alaska
conviction or one from another jurisdiction -- on the sentencing
of an Alaska offender implicates issues of policy that are
uniquely Alaskan in character and have nothing to do with
California law.3 Alaska law must govern. Cf. State v.
Edmondson, 818 P.2d 855 (N.M. App. 1991).4
Because the record demonstrates that Mancini's 1978
California burglary conviction satisfies the definition of a
prior felony conviction set forth in AS 12.55.145(a)(2), Judge
Carpeneti correctly determined that Mancini had two prior felony
convictions for presumptive sentencing purposes. Dismissal of
Mancini's application for post-conviction relief was not error.
The order of dismissal is AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
1. The state raises a threshold issue of waiver in light of Mancini's
concession, at his original sentencing hearing, that he was subject to
sentencing as a third felony offender. Judge Carpeneti, however, found the
record inadequate to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver. The judge
deemed it preferable to address the merits of Mancini's post-conviction
relief application. Given the superior court's decision to rule on the
merits, we decline to address the state's waiver argument.
2. Under California Welfare & Institution Code ' 602, "[a]ny person who is
under the age of 18 years when [the person] violates any law . . . is
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court[.]" A juvenile adjudication
is not deemed a criminal conviction for any purpose. Cal. Welf. & Inst.
Code ' 203.
3. In discussing California's sentence enhancement statute, both parties stray
into the area of full faith and credit. But this case presents no issue of
constitutional dimension: by no stretch of the imagination can Mancini be
seen as attempting to enforce a California judgment. See State, Dep't of
Pub. Safety v. Fann, 864 P.2d 533, 536 (Alaska 1993).
4. Mancini's reliance on People v. Burgos, 415 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sup. Ct. 1979),
and People v. Carpenteur, 236 N.E.2d 850(N.Y. 1968), is mistaken, since
those cases are readily distinguishable from Mancini's. In both cases, New
York courts relied on California law in declining to enhance a New York
offender's
sentence based on prior California convictions that had resulted in CYA commitments.
Pivotal to both cases, however, was a New York youthful offender scheme
that paralleled California's and a New York sentence enhancement statute
that, like California's, barred enhancement when a prior New York
conviction resulted in an offender's treatment as a youthful offender.
Given the similarities of the California and New York youthful offender and
sentence enhancement statutes, the New York courts concluded that
California's determination that an offender should receive youthful
offender treatment deserved to be credited in applying New York's sentence
enhancement statute. In contrast to New York's enhancement statute, which
expressly recognizes and gives prominence to an offender's prior treatment
as a youthful offender, Alaska's definition of prior felony conviction, as
set forth in AS 12.55.145(a)(2), attaches no significance to the manner in
which a previously convicted offender was treated, provided that the
offender was in fact previously convicted.
Mancini also cites Hansen v. State, 576 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Alaska 1978), to
support finding that California and Alaska treat juveniles similarly. This
claim is erroneous. Mancini inaccurately interprets Hansen as holding
"that a defendant who had been placed under the juvenile supervision of the
superior court at the age of 17 and committed a burglary at the age of 18
while still under juvenile supervision could not be tried on a criminal
charge unless the supervising court waived its juvenile jurisdiction."
Mancini is wrong. Mancini does not cite the holding in Hansen; he cites
the argument made in Hansen, which the Alaska Supreme Court found
"imaginative [but] not persuasive." Id. at 1353.
