Municipality of Anchorage v. Sanders (9/15/95) ap-1437
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal correction before publication in the
Pacific Reporter. Readers are requested to
bring typographical or other formal errors to
the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska
99501, in order that corrections may be made
prior to permanent publication.
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-5469
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 3AN-M94-91CR
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
JEFFREY SANDERS, )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 1437 - September 15,
1995]
________________________________)
Appeal from the District Court, Third
Judicial District, Anchorage, Michael L.
Wolverton, Judge.
Appearances: James L. Walker, Assistant
Municipal Prosecutor, Richard L. McVeigh,
Municipal Attorney, Anchorage, for Appellant.
Jason A. Steen, Gorton & Associates,
Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Judge, Coats and
Mannheimer, Judges.
BRYNER, Chief Judge.
The Municipality of Anchorage charged Jeffrey Sanders
with malicious destruction of property in violation of Anchorage
Municipal Code (AMC) 08.05.400.1 District Court Judge Michael
L. Wolverton dismissed the prosecution because J.P., who formerly
lived with Sanders and was the owner of the property Sanders
damaged, had civilly compromised with Sanders and agreed to drop
the charges. The municipality appeals, contending that a civil
compromise is impermissible when a crime is committed against a
person who previously lived in a spousal relationship with the
defendant. We reverse.
On December 23, 1993, Jeffrey Sanders broke into the
home he had once shared with J.P. J.P. was not present at the
time of the break-in. Sanders damaged some of J.P.'s property,
including a stereo and a vacuum cleaner, scattered the broken
pieces around the home, along with knives and scissors, and then
apparently passed out on the couch. When J.P. returned home,
Sanders was still unconscious. J.P. saw the house in disarray;
she took the display of knives and scissors to be threatening and
contacted the police, who arrested Sanders for malicious
destruction of property.
Prior to trial, Sanders moved to dismiss the case under
Alaska's civil compromise statute, AS 12.45.120, claiming that he
had civilly compromised the case with J.P. and had paid her $800
to replace her property. The municipality opposed the motion,
arguing that, because J.P. had previously lived in a spousal
relationship with Sanders,2 civil compromise was barred by AS
12.45.120(5)(D). Alaska Statute 12.45.120 provides, in relevant
part:
If a defendant is held to answer on
a charge of misdemeanor for which the person
injured by the act constituting the crime has
a remedy by a civil action, the crime may be
compromised except when it was committed
. . .
(5) against
(A) a spouse or a
former spouse of the defendant;
[or]
. . .
(D) a person who is
not a spouse or former spouse of
the defendant but who previously
lived in a spousal relationship
with the defendant.
Judge Wolverton, however, granted Sanders' motion to
dismiss, ruling that the bar against civil compromise set forth
in AS 12.45.120(5)(D) does not refer to property crimes, but only
to "crimes against a person" -- that is, those crimes designated
in Chapter 41 of Alaska's Revised Criminal Code (AS 11.41.100 -
11.41.530) as "Offenses Against the Person." The municipality
contends on appeal that Judge Wolverton erred by ruling that AS
12.45.120(5)(D) precludes only "crimes against a person" from
civil compromise. In the municipality's view, the section
plainly applies to all crimes resulting in any form of injury to
a person who previously lived in a spousal relationship with the
defendant. We agree.
The language of AS 12.45.120(5)(D) itself provides no
basis for restricting the statutory bar against civil compromise
to crimes formally classified in Chapter 41 as "offenses against
the person." In defining when civil compromise will be barred,
AS 12.45.120(5)(D) focuses on the identity of the crime victim
rather than on the nature of the injury inflicted. The statute
specifies that compromise will not be allowed when a "crime . . .
was committed . . . against . . . a person . . . who previously
lived in a spousal relationship with the defendant." By
contrast, Chapter 41 groups together a series of offenses, not by
the identity of the crime victim, but according to the nature of
the injury that the included offenses cause: the offenses
included in Chapter 41 all involve bodily injury or the threat of
bodily injury, that is, injury to "the person" as distinguished
from injury to "a person."
There is no reason to suppose that a crime can be
"committed . . . against . . . a person" for purposes of AS
12.45.120(5)(D) only when it involves bodily injury -- an injury
to "the person." Such a conclusion would essentially hold
property crimes to be victimless offenses and, in so doing, would
run counter to prevailing legal definitions. For example, AS
12.55.185(13)(A) broadly defines "victim" as "a person against
whom an offense has been perpetrated." It is clear that the
legislature did not intend this definition to be limited to
"offenses against the person," because the term "victim" appears
in statutes defining property crimes that are outside that class.
See AS 11.46.210(b) (theft by failure to make required
disposition of funds); AS 11.46.620(b) (misapplication of
property). Alaska Statutes 12.55.185(8) uses the term "victim"
in its definition of "pecuniary gain": "the amount of money or
value of property returned to the victim of the offense" is not
included in the amount of the offender's "pecuniary gain" from
the offense.3 This court has commonly stated that crimes that
are not "offenses against the person" can be committed against
"victims."4
Sanders nevertheless argues that the legislative
history of AS 12.45.120(5) demonstrates that the legislature
intended it to be limited in scope to crimes such as physical and
sexual assault. The legislature added paragraph (5) to the
statute in 1988 in response to this court's decision in State v.
Nelles, 713 P.2d 806, 810 (Alaska App. 1986), which upheld the
civil compromise and dismissal of a domestic violence assault
case, noting that it was the province of the legislature, not
this court, to enact a "domestic disputes" exception to the civil
compromise statute. In 1987, Governor Steve Cowper sent a letter
to the legislature discussing Nelles and urging that the
legislature "prohibit the `civil compromise' of criminal cases
arising from domestic violence situations." 1987 House Journal
191-93. This letter emphasized the public interest in curbing
"domestic violence"5 and "abuse."
However, it appears that the legislature ultimately
elected not to limit the prohibition on civil compromises to
offenses such as assault. Although the original house bill did
specifically provide that crimes committed "by assault against"
the enumerated domestic victims could not be civilly compromised,
H.B. 463 (1986), when the bill was reintroduced the following
year the "by assault" restriction had been omitted, and the bill
was enacted into law with the current language. H.B. 122 (1987);
ch. 4, 1, SLA 1988. The house specifically rejected a proposed
amendment to H.B. 122 that would have limited the exception to "a
case involving a misdemeanor charge under AS 11.41, criminal
trespass (AS 11.46.320-.330), harassment (AS 11.61.120), or a
similar municipal ordinance."
Notably, other statutes do contain limiting language
similar to the language the house declined to include in the
civil compromise statute.6 Because the legislature chose to omit
such limiting language from the coverage of AS 12.45.120(5), we
find no basis for construing the statutory language to include
only crimes formally classified as "offenses against the person,"
and we conclude that the statute prohibits the civil compromise
of all crimes committed against victims enumerated therein.
We REVERSE the order of dismissal and REMAND for
further proceedings in this case.
_______________________________
1. AMC 08.05.400 provides: "It is unlawful for any
person to maliciously injure or destroy any real or personal
property not his own."
2. It is undisputed that Sanders and J.P., though not
married, had lived together in a spousal relationship.
3. The title of AS 12.45.120 also uses the term "victim,"
although the body of the statute itself uses instead the phrase
"person injured by the act constituting the crime."
4. See, e.g., Roath v. State, 874 P.2d 312, 313-14 (Alaska
App. 1994) (defendant's criminal impersonation, although
classified as an "offense against property," embarrassed and
humiliated "victims"), petition for hearing denied, 879 P.2d 1008
(Alaska 1994); Coleman v. State, 846 P.2d 141, 143 & n.1 (Alaska
App. 1993) ("Theft is, in fact, a crime against the victim's
right to possess the property . . . . This is why theft can be
committed against a person who does not own the property . . .
.").
5. AS 12.55.185(3) and AS 25.35.200 define "domestic
violence" as "a crime under AS 11.41" with an enumeration of
victims similar to that appearing in AS 12.45.120(5).
6. See, e.g., AS 12.25.030(b)(2), which provides that a
police officer may arrest a person without a warrant if there is
reasonable cause to believe that the person committed a crime
under
AS 11.41, AS 11.46.330, or AS 11.61.120,
or has violated an ordinance with elements
substantially similar to the elements of a
crime under AS 11.41, AS 11.46.330, or AS
11.61.120, when the victim is a spouse or
former spouse of the person who committed the
crime; a parent, grandparent, child, or
grandchild of the person who committed the
crime; a member of the social unit comprised
of [sic] those living together in the same
dwelling as the person who committed the
crime; or another person who is not a spouse
or former spouse of the person who committed
the crime but who previously lived in a
spousal relationship with the person who
committed the crime or is in or has been in a
dating, courtship, or engagement relationship
with the person who committed the crime.
Governor Cowper's letter to the legislature specifically cited
AS 12.25.030(b). 1987 House Journal at 193. See also AS
12.55.155(c)(18)(A), which provides an aggravating factor under
the presumptive sentencing scheme if the offense was one
"specified in AS 11.41" with a truncated but similar set of
domestic victims.
