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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
ROY HUGO, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-5374
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 2BA-93-515 Cr
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 1426 - August 11, 1995]
______________________________)
Appeal from the District Court, Second Judicial
District, Barrow, Michael I. Jeffery, Judge, and Daniel N. Cadra,
Magistrate.
Appearances: Dick L. Madson, Fairbanks, for Appellant.
Joseph S. Slusser, Assistant District Attorney, Barrow, Harry L.
Davis, District Attorney, Fairbanks, and Bruce M. Botelho,
Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Judge, and Coats and Mannheimer,
Judges.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
After police found several bags of marijuana in his
luggage, Roy Hugo pleaded no contest to sixth-degree misconduct
involving a controlled substance, AS 11.71.060(a). Under Cooksey
v. State, 524 P.2d 1251, 1255-57 (Alaska 1974), Hugo preserved
his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress the evidence against him. We now affirm Hugo's
conviction.
The issue on appeal concerns the validity of the search
warrant that authorized the police to search Hugo's luggage.
North Slope Borough Public Safety Officer Chris Dunbar applied
for the warrant. His testimony to Magistrate Daniel N. Cadra was
as follows:
Dunbar had been at the airport in Anaktuvuk Pass the
previous evening. While Dunbar was there, he saw Hugo's wife
pass an envelope to the pilot of a plane. When Dunbar asked her
what the envelope contained, Hugo's wife told Dunbar that she was
sending Hugo his watch so that he could wake up on time.
A couple of hours later, an informant told Dunbar that
Hugo had gone to Fairbanks and would return the next day with
drugs and alcohol. The informant told Dunbar that Hugo had been
selling marijuana from his home, and that Hugo would be returning
shortly with two more bags of marijuana.
About two hours later that same evening, a second
informant called Dunbar. This informant had provided information
to Dunbar in the past. The informant told Dunbar that Hugo would
return to Anaktuvuk Pass the next day with marijuana as well as a
couple of jugs of alcohol. The informant added that, the last
time Hugo had brought marijuana to Anaktuvuk Pass, he had
concealed it in his coat.
Dunbar further informed the magistrate that he knew
(from personal knowledge) that there had been alcohol in
Anaktuvuk Pass following Hugo's return from his last trip out of
the village two weeks before. At that time, Dunbar had seen both
Hugo and his wife intoxicated.
Magistrate Cadra asked Dunbar about the first
informant. Dunbar replied that this first informant had never
given him information before, and therefore Dunbar could not say
that the informant was credible. However, Dunbar told the
magistrate that he knew of no reason to doubt the first
informant's credibility. Dunbar also stated that this informant
was not being paid or given concessions for the information.
Magistrate Cadra also asked about the second informant.
Dunbar testified that the second informant had given him reliable
information in the past, that this informant was a respected
member of the community, and that the informant was someone
Dunbar would readily believe.
Based on Dunbar's testimony, Magistrate Cadra found
probable cause to believe that Hugo would be carrying marijuana
when he returned to Anaktuvuk Pass, and he issued the warrant
authorizing the police to search Hugo's person and luggage. On
appeal, Hugo argues that Dunbar's testimony failed to establish
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.
Under Alaska law, the adequacy of a search warrant
application is evaluated under the Aguilar/Spinelli test. State
v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 322 (Alaska 1985). See Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).
Under the Aguilar/Spinelli test, to the extent that the search
warrant application rests on hearsay, the government must satisfy
a two-prong test for each hearsay declarant. First, the
government must establish that the hearsay declarant obtained his
or her knowledge in a reliable manner (generally, through first-
hand observation) and is not just speculating or repeating
gossip. Second, the government must establish that the hearsay
declarant is a credible person; this prong may be met by showing
reasons to believe that the informant is a trustworthy person, or
by showing that the informant's information has been
independently corroborated. Jones, 706 P.2d at 323-25.
In Hugo's case, the search warrant application relied
on Dunbar's personal observations (which are not subject to
Aguilar/Spinelli analysis; see Kvasnikoff v. State, 804 P.2d
1302, 1306 n.3 (Alaska App. 1991)) and on the information Dunbar
received from the two anonymous informants. With respect to
these two informants, Hugo argues that neither prong of the
Aguilar/Spinelli test was met.
Hugo first contends that the government failed to show
that the informants were relaying information that they had
obtained in a reliable way (e.g,, first-hand). It is true that,
during Dunbar's testimony, he never asserted that his informants
had first-hand knowledge of the matters under consideration.
However, this first prong of the Aguilar/Spinelli test may be
established by inference if an informant furnishes the sort of
detail that generally could be obtained only through personal
knowledge. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313, 79 S.Ct.
329, 333, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Schmid v. State, 615 P.2d 565,
574 (Alaska 1980).
Here, the first informant named Hugo's destination,
identified the day on which Hugo would be returning to Anaktuvuk
Pass, told Dunbar that Hugo would be bringing back both marijuana
and liquor, and even told Dunbar how many bags of marijuana Hugo
would be carrying when he returned. The second informant
likewise identified the day of Hugo's return, told Dunbar that
Hugo would be carrying both marijuana and liquor, and described
how Hugo had concealed the contraband in his coat on his last
smuggling trip. These details were sufficient to allow
Magistrate Cadra to infer that the two informants had personal
knowledge of the matters they spoke of.
Hugo next contends that the government failed to
establish that the two informants were trustworthy (i.e., that
they were credible sources of information). With respect to the
first informant, Hugo points out that Dunbar admittedly had not
dealt with this informant before and could not say that the
informant was credible. With respect to the second informant,
Hugo concedes (based on Dunbar's testimony) that this second
informant was a presumptively credible "citizen informant" for
purposes of the Aguilar/Spinelli test. Nevertheless, Hugo points
out, even when information is furnished by a citizen informant,
some details of the information must be corroborated before
Aguilar/Spinelli is satisfied. Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508,
518 (Alaska 1973).
We conclude, however, that Magistrate Cadra could
properly find this second prong satisfied. Both informants
reported to Dunbar that Hugo had left town; Dunbar independently
knew this from his encounter with Hugo's wife at the airport.
Each of the informants told Dunbar that Hugo would be returning
the next day and that he would be carrying both marijuana and
liquor. Dunbar independently knew that Hugo and his wife had
been intoxicated following Hugo's return from his last trip
outside the village just two weeks before. This information
tended to corroborate the two informants' assertions that Hugo
was smuggling alcohol into the village. Moreover, the fact that
Dunbar received the same information from two separate sources
tends to provide corroboration for each informant's tip. See
Davenport v. State, 568 P.2d 939, 949 (Alaska 1977) ("Although
the reliability of the informant had not been established in the
past, his tip was independently corroborated by information
[received] from two 'citizen informants,' persons whose
credibility may be considered less questionable than that of an
unnamed and possibly criminal police contact."); Lewis v. State,
862 P.2d 181, 186 n.5 (Alaska App. 1993) ("For purposes of the
Aguilar-Spinelli doctrine, the veracity of a statement given by a
police informant whose reliability is unknown may be established
by a corroborating statement from another informant: Cross-
corroboration among informants is a well-accepted method of
demonstrating the validity of the information given.").
In sum, we conclude that Magistrate Cadra did not abuse
his discretion when he issued the search warrant in this case.
The judgement of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.
