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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
WILLIAM H. HAMMAN, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-5169
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 3KN-93-602 Cr
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 1379 - November 10, 1994]
________________________________)
Appeal from the District Court, Third
Judicial District, Kenai, Lynn H.
Christensen, Judge.
Appearances: Susan M. Crocker,
Assistant Public Defender, Kenai, and John B.
Salemi, Public Defender, Anchorage, for
Appellant. Daniel R. Cooper, Jr., Assistant
District Attorney, Sharon A.S. Illsley,
District Attorney, Kenai, and Bruce M.
Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appel
lee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Judge, and Coats
and Mannheimer, Judges.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
William H. Hamman entered a no contest plea to the
charge of driving while his license was revoked, AS 28.15.291,
reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his
motion to suppress the evidence against him. See Cooksey v.
State, 524 P.2d 1251, 1255-57 (Alaska 1974). Hamman argues that
the police had insufficient justification for stopping his car.
We affirm Hamman's conviction.
At the evidentiary hearing on Hamman's motion to
suppress, Soldotna Police Officer Robbie Quelland testified that
around 3:00 a.m. on Sunday morning, May 2, 1993 he observed
Hamman's vehicle traveling on the Sterling Highway. Quelland
followed Hamman for one-half to three-quarters of a mile. During
this time, Hamman's van was "weaving quite noticeabl[y]" within
his lane of travel. The road surface was dry and the lane
markers were clearly visible. According to Quelland, Hamman's
van swayed back and forth in the lane, as if the driver "wasn't
able to maintain a straight path". At one point, Hamman's
passenger-side tires crossed over the white fog line and onto the
right shoulder of the road; Hamman drove on the shoulder for
about thirty feet before he "jerked" the van back into the lane.
Suspecting that the driver of the van was intoxicated, based both
on the van's movements and on the time of day, Quelland stopped
the vehicle. This traffic stop led to Hamman's arrest.
Hamman also testified at the evidentiary hearing. He
declared that he could not remember whether he had been weaving
or not. Hamman remembered driving onto the shoulder of the road,
but he asserted that he purposely did this because he had seen
Quelland's headlights behind him and thought Quelland might want
to pass his van. The district court denied Hamman's motion to
suppress.
A police officer can make an investigative stop of an
automobile when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the
driver of the automobile is intoxicated. Ebona v. State, 577
P.2d 698, 701 (Alaska 1978). The reasonableness of the officer's
suspicion is judged in light of the totality of the circumstances
known to the officer at the time of the stop. Ozhuwan v. State,
786 P.2d 918, 921 (Alaska App. 1990); State v. Moran, 667 P.2d
734, 736 (Alaska App. 1983).
Here, Officer Quelland observed Hamman's van being
driven erratically. He saw the vehicle weave within its lane; he
also saw the vehicle leave its lane of travel and then jerk back
into the lane. Even if Hamman had not left his lane of travel,
it was not necessary for Quelland to wait for Hamman to violate a
traffic law before stopping him. A police officer need not
"see[] the person he ultimately stops do something dangerous. ...
It is sufficient if the officer observes facts which lead him to
reasonably believe that the person to be stopped is dangerous."
Moran, 667 P.2d at 736 (emphasis in the original).
Having seen Hamman's vehicle repeatedly weave on the
highway for a distance of more than a half-mile, Quelland could
reasonably conclude that Hamman was a dangerous driver; this
reasonable belief justified his investigative stop of Hamman's
van. For example, in Ebona the officer observed Ebona's car
swerving, going from the center line to the right-hand edge, but
at no time did Ebona's vehicle leave its proper lane of travel.
The supreme court upheld the investigatory stop in spite of the
police officer's explicit concession that he never observed Ebona
violate a traffic rule and that he watched Ebona make two correct
turns. Ebona, 577 P.2d at 701 n.12.
The lateness of the hour (3:00 a.m. on a Sunday),
combined with the officer's knowledge that intoxicated drivers
are more likely to be on the road at such an hour than at other
times, is another circumstance that supports the reasonableness
of Quelland's suspicion. We stress, however, that the primary
circumstance justifying the stop of Hamman's vehicle was
Quelland's observation of Hamman's erratic driving.
The judgement of the district court is AFFIRMED.
