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THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
J.R.N., A Minor, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-5274
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 3AN-S89-505CP
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
STATE OF ALASKA, )
) [No. 1378 - November 10, 1994]
Appellee. )
________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judi
cial District, Anchorage, Peter A. Michalski,
Judge.
Appearances: Suzanne Weller, Assistant
Public Defender, and John B. Salemi, Public
Defender, Anchorage, for Appellant. Eric A.
Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Special Prosecutions and Appeals,
Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney
General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Judge, Coats, Judge,
and Andrews, Superior Court Judge.*
[Mannheimer, Judge, not participating.]
BRYNER, Chief Judge.
Sixteen-year-old J.R.N. was arrested and charged as a
juvenile delinquent for conduct amounting to first-degree murder
and other related offenses. Following a hearing, the superior
court issued an order waiving juvenile jurisdiction over J.R.N.
This court reversed the superior court's waiver order, finding
that the order was based in part on a confession obtained from
J.R.N. in violation of his right to immediate parental notice of
arrest, as provided for in Alaska Delinquency Rule 7(b). J.R.N.
v. State, 809 P.2d 416 (Alaska App. 1991). In that decision, we
reasoned that the right to parental notice could not be waived by
J.R.N. alone. Id. at 419-20.
The Alaska Supreme Court reversed this court's
decision, concluding that a juvenile may waive the right to
parental notice, provided that the waiver is knowing and
voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. State v.
J.R.N., 861 P.2d 578, 580-81 (Alaska 1993). The supreme court
remanded J.R.N.'s case to the superior court to determine whether
J.R.N. had waived the right. Id. at 581. On remand, Superior
Court Judge Peter A. Michalski concluded that J.R.N. had
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to parental notice.
J.R.N. appeals this determination.
In an appeal from a determination of voluntariness, we
must accept the trial court's factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous; we independently decide the ultimate issue of
voluntariness. State v. Ridgely, 732 P.2d 550, 554 (Alaska
1987).1
Our review of the record convinces us that the superior
court's factual findings on remand, a copy of which we attach
hereto and incorporate herein, are not clearly erroneous.
Accepting these facts, we independently conclude that the
superior court did not err in finding that J.R.N. knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to immediate parental notice.
J.R.N.'s primary contention on appeal is that he could
not have waived a right of which he was unaware. He claims that,
because the police did not formally and explicitly advise him of
his right to have his parents immediately notified of his arrest,
or of the further right to consult with them and to have them
present during any interrogation -- a subsidiary right that
J.R.N. maintains is encompassed within the right to immediate
notification (an issue we need not address) -- he could not
properly be found to have knowingly waived the right to immediate
notice. Virtually all of the cases J.R.N. relies on, however,
involve Miranda2 warnings and are therefore inapposite.
The giving of express, formalized explanations of
rights has generally been required as a precondition of a valid
waiver only in situations directly involving the Miranda rule or
in cases dealing with the unique constellation of fundamental
rights that are necessary to assure the integrity of a trial.
Compare, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), with
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); see also 3 Wayne
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 8.1(a), at 149-52 (2d ed. 1987).
In contexts other than these, there is no general rule that the
voluntary relinquishment of a right, even a constitutional right,
must be preceded by a specific explanation or warning of its
existence. For example, fourth amendment waivers by individuals
who have not been apprised of the right to refuse a warrantless
search are commonly upheld when they appear to be voluntary under
the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Frink v. State,
597 P.2d 154, 169 (Alaska 1979)(individual need not be informed
of right to refuse search before validly waiving fourth amendment
rights in noncustodial situation); Gray v. State, 596 P.2d 1154,
1155 & 1158 n.18 (Alaska 1979)(individual need not be informed of
right to refuse search before validly waiving fourth amendment
rights in custodial situation where Miranda warnings are given).
Likewise, in situations involving noncustodial police
interrogation (where Miranda warnings need not be given), the
voluntariness of a confession has never been conditioned on the
suspect being advised of the right to remain silent. See, e.g.,
Macauly v. State, 734 P.2d 1020, 1023-25 (Alaska App. 1987).
The right to immediate parental notice is one set out
by rule and is not a fundamental constitutional right designed to
protect the integrity of trial. J.R.N. was expressly asked if he
wanted the police to call his parents; the superior court
properly found that the circumstances surrounding this request
were such that J.R.N. could reasonably infer that he would have
been allowed to consult with his parents and to have them present
prior to any interrogation. J.R.N. nevertheless immediately
declined. Given the totality of the circumstances, as more fully
described in the trial court's findings, we conclude that J.R.N.
voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to parental notice.3
The superior court's order waiving juvenile
jurisdiction over J.R.N. is AFFIRMED.
The attachments to this opinion of the Findings and Order on
Remand dated March 4, 1994, will be faxed to West Publishing.
_______________________________
*Sitting by assignment made pursuant to article IV, section
16 of the Alaska Constitution.
1. The state maintains that a more deferential standard of
review should be applied in this case because the case does not
involve a constitutionally established right. However, in our
view, the appropriateness of the traditional standard of review
of a voluntariness decision inheres more in the uniqueness and
complexity of the determination than in the fundamentality of the
right at issue in a particular case. See, e.g., Johnson v.
State, 631 P.2d 508, 510-13 (Alaska App. 1981).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. J.R.N. additionally complains that his waiver was
vitiated by the failure of the police to offer to call his
parents immediately after his arrest. However, because J.R.N.
made no statements during the delay between his arrest and
interrogation, any violation of the right to immediate notice
resulting from the delay was inconsequential except as a factor
bearing on the overall issue of voluntariness. The superior
court's findings expressly address the issue of delay as an
aspect of the totality of the circumstances bearing on the
voluntariness of J.R.N.'s waiver. See Findings and Order on
Remand, paragraph no. 2.
J.R.N. further attempts to argue that his confession
must be suppressed because it was the fruit of police
interrogation that occurred before he declined to have his
parents called. As correctly found by the superior court on
remand, however, no pre-waiver interrogation occurred. See
Findings and Order on Remand, paragraph no. 3.
