NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal correction before publication in the
Pacific Reporter. Readers are requested to
bring typographical or other formal errors to
the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska
99501, in order that corrections may be made
prior to permanent publication.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
STATE OF ALASKA, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-4239
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 4FA-87-83 CP
)
v. )
)
T.M., a Minor, )
)
Appellee. )
________________________________)
STATE OF ALASKA, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-4240
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 4FA-88-175 CP
)
v. )
) O P I N I O N
J.B., a Minor, )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 1322 - October 22, 1993]
________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth
Judicial District, Fairbanks, Jay Hodges,
Judge in A-4239, and Mary E. Greene, Judge in
A-4240.
Appearances: Nora King, Assistant
Attorney General, Fairbanks, and Charles E.
Cole, Attorney General, Juneau, for
Appellant. Marcia E. Holland, Assistant
Public Defender, Fairbanks, and John B. Sale
mi, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Judge, and Coats
and Mannheimer, Judges.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
T.M. and J.B. were each adjudicated delinquent minors
in separate judgements. T.M. was placed on probation supervised
by the Department of Health and Social Services; his probation
expired on October 1, 1988. J.B. was likewise placed on super
vised probation; his probation, extended once, ultimately expired
on May 14, 1991.
On October 1, 1991, three years after T.M.'s probation
expired, his attorney petitioned the superior court to set aside
T.M.'s adjudication of delinquency. On November 11, 1991, six
months after J.B.'s probation expired, his attorney likewise
petitioned the superior court to set aside J.B.'s adjudication of
delinquency. Both minors alleged that their good behavior since
the time they were adjudicated delinquents justified setting
their adjudications aside.
The minors relied on AS 47.10.100(a) as the court's
authority to grant the relief they sought. The pertinent part of
this statute reads:
Retention of jurisdiction over minor.
(a) The court retains jurisdiction over the
[juvenile's] case and may at any time stay
execution, modify, set aside, revoke, or
enlarge a judgment or order, or grant a new
hearing, in the exercise of its power of
protection over the minor and for the minor's
best interest, for a period of time not to
exceed two years or in any event extend past
the day the minor becomes 19, unless sooner
discharged by the court ... .
(Emphasis added) T.M. and J.B. argued that AS 47.10.100(c) gives
the superior court the authority to set aside an adjudication of
delinquency, not only for legal flaws in the adjudication
process, but also based on a minor's subsequent good behavior
during institutionalization and probation. The minors contended
that this statute is the juvenile delinquency counterpart of AS
12.55.085, the statute that authorizes a sentencing judge in a
criminal action to suspend imposition of a defendant's sentence,
place the defendant on probation, and ultimately (if the
defendant successfully completes probation) set aside the
defendant's conviction.
The State objected that the superior court no longer
had jurisdiction to grant the minors' requests. The State
pointed out that, under AS 47.10.100(a), the superior court's
jurisdiction over the minors' cases had ended when the minors
were discharged from the court's supervision.
Nevertheless, Superior Court Judge Jay Hodges vacated
T.M.'s delinquency adjudication. Judge Hodges ruled that,
notwithstanding any limiting language in AS 47.10.100(a), the
superior court had the inherent power to vacate any adjudication
of delinquency it had previously entered. In J.B.'s case,
Superior Court Judge Mary E. Greene apparently adopted the same
view of the court's power, since she likewise vacated the
delinquency adjudication over the State's jurisdictional
objection. The State now appeals. We reverse.
Under AS 47.10.100(a), the superior court "retains
jurisdiction over [a delinquent juvenile's] case ... [only] for a
period of time not to exceed two years [from the date of the
delinquency adjudication] or in any event [not to] extend past
the day the minor becomes 19, unless sooner discharged by the
court". See also AS 47.10.100(c), which declares that the
superior court's children's jurisdiction over a minor "never
extends beyond the minor's 19th birthday, except that the
department may apply for and the court may grant an additional
one-year period of supervision ... if continued supervision is in
the best interests of the person and if the person consents to
it."
Because T.M. and J.B. filed their motions after this
time limitation on the court's jurisdiction had expired, the
superior court based its action, not on AS 47.10.100(a), but on
the court's "inherent" power to vacate any delinquency adjudica
tion it had previously entered -- even an adjudication that has
no legal flaw. We conclude that the superior court does not
possess this kind of inherent authority.
In general, when a statute or rule specifies a time
limit on the court's power to modify or vacate a judgement, the
court has no power to act outside this time limit. 46 Am.Jur.2d,
Judgments, 704, pp. 854-56; W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal
Procedure (1984), 25.2(e), Vol. 3, p. 131. In Davenport v.
State, 543 P.2d 1204, 1210-11 (Alaska 1975), the supreme court
declared that the superior court has no inherent power to retain
jurisdiction over a criminal case and modify its judgement based
on later events. Any power the superior court might have to
modify a criminal judgement must stem from statute or rule.1 The
rule is the same in civil cases. See Stone v. Stone, 647 P.2d
582, 585-86 (Alaska 1982), in which the supreme court held that,
after the expiration of the 1-year time limit specified in Alaska
Civil Rule 60(b), the superior court no longer has the power to
modify a judgement in a civil action on the basis of alleged
fraud.2
The Alaska Supreme Court adhered to this same rule in
Thomas v. State, 566 P.2d 630 (Alaska 1977). One issue in Thomas
was whether a trial court had the authority to modify or reduce a
sentence of imprisonment under Criminal Rule 35(a) when the
defendant had not sought relief until after expiration of the
time limit specified in the rule (at that time, 60 days following
entry of judgement). Thomas, 566 P.2d at 638. The supreme court
held that the trial court had the power to relax the time limit.
Thomas, 566 P.2d at 639. However, the important aspect of the
supreme court's ruling is that the supreme court did not rely on
the superior court's "inherent" power to modify its judgements.
Rather, the supreme court held that Criminal Rule 53 (the rule
that allows courts to relax the provisions of the other criminal
rules when strict adherence to them will work manifest injustice)
was the source of the trial court's power to relax the time limit
found in Rule 35(a). Id.
Thus, in Thomas the supreme court implicitly reaffirmed
the doctrine it had announced in Davenport: that a trial court's
power to modify or vacate a judgement must be exercised within
the bounds (here, the time limits) of the applicable statutes and
rules. The supreme court reaffirmed this same doctrine in Stone
when the court held that the superior court has no power to amend
or vacate a judgement obtained through fraud after the 1-year
time limitation specified in Civil Rule 60(b) has expired. The
supreme court's ruling in Stone was premised on the fact that
Civil Rule 6(b) - the civil counterpart of Criminal Rule 53 -
explicitly states that the rule cannot be employed to relax the
time limit of Civil Rule 60(b). Stone, 647 P.2d at 585-86.
Attempting to avoid this conclusion, T.M. and J.B.
place considerable reliance on a portion of the holding in Thomas
in which the supreme court held that "the constitutional grant of
judicial power [in Article IV, Section 1 of the Alaska Constitu
tion] encompasses the inherent judicial power of Alaska's trial
courts to reduce or modify their own sentences." Thomas,
566 P.2d at 638. However, the supreme court in Thomas carefully
distinguished (a) the superior court's inherent power to reduce
or modify a sentence of imprisonment (that is, alter the terms of
a type of sentence that the trial court was originally entitled
to impose) from (b) the power to suspend the execution of a
sentence and place a defendant on probation - a type of sentence
which the court lacks the power to impose in the absence of
express legislative authorization. Thomas, 566 P.2d at 637-38;
Pete v. State, 379 P.2d 625, 626 (Alaska 1963).
In the present case, T.M. and J.B. asked the superior
court to nullify two valid and ostensibly final judgements - an
exercise of power arguably much broader than suspending execution
of sentence and granting probation. The minors sought to have
the superior court set aside their underlying adjudications, not
because of any flaw in the judicial process, but because of their
subsequent progress toward rehabilitation. T.M. and J.B. asked
the court to grant them after-the-fact exoneration because of
their good behavior - something that normally would be considered
an act of "pardon".3 Assuming for purposes of argument that the
courts' exercise of such a power would be consistent with the
"separation of powers" doctrine4, Thomas ineluctably leads to the
conclusion that this power is not inherent in the judiciary and
would have to be granted by the legislature.
Thus, even assuming that AS 47.10.100(a) gives the
superior court the power to set aside a delinquency adjudication
based solely on the minor's subsequent good behavior (an issue
that we specifically decline to decide), the court must act
within the jurisdictional time limits established in the statute.
In their supplemental brief, T.M. and J.B. argue that
the various provisions of Delinquency Rule 1 authorize the
superior court to employ its "inherent" power to adopt any
procedure and set any time limit the court believes fair. We
cannot accept this reading of the rule. As we discussed above,
the superior court does not have an "inherent" power to set aside
a legally valid delinquency adjudication. Even if we assume that
this power is granted by AS 47.10.100(a), the superior court is
nevertheless presumptively obliged to follow the procedures and
time limits established by that statute when exercising that
power.
It is true that Delinquency Rule 1 authorizes the
superior court to use any procedure specified in the delinquency
rules, the civil rules, the criminal rules, or the Alaska
statutes, or recognized at common law. But Delinquency Rule 1
does not give the superior court carte blanche authority to
ignore or set aside statutory procedures and time limits. By its
terms, Delinquency Rule 1(d) authorizes the superior court to
ignore statutory requirements only when the delinquency rules
provide an alternative procedure. The Delinquency Rules do not
provide an alternative procedure which allows the superior court
to set aside a valid delinquency adjudication. Likewise,
Delinquency Rule 1(f) authorizes the superior court to ignore
statutory requirements only when a civil rule, a criminal rule,
or the common law grants the court the power to employ an alterna
tive method of procedure.
Criminal Rule 53 (made applicable to juvenile
proceedings by Delinquency Rule 1(e)) authorizes the superior
court to relax any delinquency or criminal rule, but it does not
authorize the court to relax or ignore statutes; the superior
court's broad power to relax rules simply does not extend to
statutory enactments. And while it is certainly arguable that
the time limit for amending juvenile judgements specified in AS
47.10.100(a) involves a procedural matter that could be dealt
with by court rule, the superior court lacks rule-making
authority; the supreme court, which possesses sole rule-making
authority, has enacted no rule altering the statutory limit.
In short, T.M. and J.B. have not cited any provision of
the delinquency rules, the civil rules, the criminal rules, or
the common law that addresses the issue of setting aside a valid
delinquency adjudication or that provides specific authority for
the superior court to ignore the time limitation contained in
AS 47.10.100(a). We have found none. We therefore conclude
that, even assuming that AS 47.10.100(a) authorizes the superior
court to set aside a valid delinquency adjudication because of
the minor's subsequent rehabilitation, and even assuming that the
time limitation contained in AS 47.10.100(a) is "procedural" for
rule-making purposes, the superior court is nevertheless governed
by that statutory limitation because the court rules provide no
alternative time limit or procedural authority.
For these reasons, the decisions of the superior court
are REVERSED and the delinquency adjudications of T.M. and J.B.
are reinstated.
_______________________________
1 But see United States v. Bishop, 774 F.2d 771, 773-74
(7th Cir. 1985), and Trueblood Longknife v. United States, 381
F.2d 17, 19-20 (9th Cir. 1967) (even after the time limitation of
Federal Criminal Rule 35 has expired, federal courts retain the
inherent power to modify a criminal sentence when the sentencing
decision was premised on a defendant's fraudulent assertions
about his past or his current circumstances).
2 In Stone, one of two divorced spouses (the former wife)
asked the superior court to modify the property settlement that
had been incorporated in the divorce decree; she alleged that her
former husband had fraudulently misrepresented the value of
certain property. The superior court granted relief, but the
supreme court reversed. The supreme court noted Alaska Civil
Rule 60(b) specifies a 1-year time limit for seeking relief from
a judgement based on allegations of fraud, a time limit that
cannot be relaxed under Civil Rule 6(b). The wife's motion to
modify the divorce decree was filed 15 months after the decree
was entered. The supreme court held that, because the wife had
failed to meet the 1-year deadline, the superior court lacked
jurisdiction to modify the divorce decree. Stone, 647 P.2d at
585-86.
3 A full pardon "frees the criminal without any condition
whatever[, erasing both] the punishment prescribed for the
offense and the guilt of the offender. It obliterates in legal
contemplation the offense itself ... ." Black's Law Dictionary
(6th ed. 1990), p. 1113 (citing State v. Cullen, 127 P.2d 257,
259 (Wash. 1942)). The Alaska Constitution, Article III, Section
21, reserves this power to the governor.
4 See LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984),
25.2(e), Vol. 3, p. 131.
