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THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
PHILLIP BRIGGS, )
Superintendent of Cook ) Court of Appeals No. A-3714
Inlet Pretrial Facility, ) Trial Court No. 3AN-90-7277CI
)
Appellant, ) O P I N I O N
v. )
)
TIMOTHY J. DONNELLY, ) [No. 1215 - April 3, 1992]
)
Appellee. )
)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Rene J. Gonzalez, Judge.
Appearances: John K. Bodick, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Special
Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and
Charles E. Cole, Attorney General, Juneau,
for Appellant. Michael Jungreis, Anchorage,
for Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Judge, Coats, Judge,
and Andrews, Superior Court Judge.*
[Mannheimer, Judge, not participating.]
COATS, Judge.
This appeal concerns the interpretation of AS 33.20.010
and AS 33.20.050, which are statutes that regulate the award of
and forfeiture of "good time" for prisoners. Superior Court
Judge Rene J. Gonzalez concluded that, under these statutes, the
Department of Corrections (DOC) could not forfeit any good time
for misbehavior that occurred before July 23, 1990, when Timothy
J. Donnelly was resentenced on two counts of sexual assault in
the first degree, AS 11.41.410(a). The state appeals, arguing
that AS 33.20.010 and AS 33.20.050 allow the DOC to forfeit good
time for incidents of misconduct that Donnelly engaged in before
his resentencing. We agree with the state and conclude that the
DOC has the authority to forfeit good time for a prisoner's
misbehavior engaged in before resentencing on the same offense.
Donnelly was convicted of two counts of first-degree
sexual assault. On May 2, 1984, the trial court sentenced
Donnelly to an eight-year-and-four-month term of imprisonment and
a concurrent eight-year term.1
Donnelly committed several prison disciplinary
infractions during his incarceration on this original sentence.
The DOC, in accordance with regulations, forfeited 876 days of
his good time. However, Donnelly had appealed his original
conviction to this court. We reversed his conviction on March 8,
1989. See Donnelly v. State, Memorandum Opinion and Judgment No.
1760 (Alaska App., March 8, 1989). On April 24, 1990, Donnelly
was again convicted after a retrial. On July 23, 1990, Superior
Court Judge Mark C. Rowland resentenced Donnelly to concurrent
eight-year presumptive terms.
In computing Donnelly's good time, the DOC subtracted,
from the present sentence's award of good time, the 876 days the
DOC had previously forfeited for the incidents that had occurred
during the time Donnelly was imprisoned under the authority of
the conviction this court had reversed. Thereafter, Donnelly
brought a writ of habeas corpus challenging the DOC's authority
to forfeit good time based upon Donnelly's conduct that occurred
before the court resentenced Donnelly.
Judge Gonzalez analyzed AS 12.55.025(c) and AS
33.20.010, .050, .051, and .071(a) and agreed with Donnelly.
Judge Gonzalez ordered the DOC to recompute the award of good
time without deducting "any time asserted to have been forfeited
by Donnelly prior to July 23, 1990," and to release Donnelly "if
the defendant has served his sentence of eight years with credit
for the amount of good time which he is entitled to under AS
33.20.010."
The parties treat this case as one that turns on the
interpretation of AS 33.20.010(a) and AS 33.20.050. Alaska
Statute 33.20.010(a) provides:
Except as provided in (b) of this
section and notwithstanding AS
12.55.125(f)(3) and 12.55.125(g)(3), a
prisoner convicted of an offense against the
state or a political subdivision of the state
and sentenced to a term of imprisonment that
exceeds three days is entitled to a deduction
of one-third of the term of imprisonment
rounded off to the nearest day if the
prisoner follows the rules of the
correctional facility in which the prisoner
is confined.
Alaska Statute 33.20.050 provides:
If during the term of imprisonment a
prisoner commits an offense or violates the
rules of the correctional facility, all or
part of the prisoner's good time may be
forfeited under regulations adopted by the
commissioner of corrections. The amount of
good time forfeited shall be related to the
severity of the offense or rule violation.
Donnelly essentially argues that under AS 33.20.010(a)
on the date of resentencing he was "entitled to a deduction of
one-third of the term of imprisonment." He reads the language
"if the prisoner follows the rules of the correctional facility
in which the prisoner is confined" to mean that good time could
only be forfeited for violations of the rules of the correctional
facility occurring after he was resentenced. In effect, Donnelly
avers that good time forfeited under the original sentence is
nullified by this court's reversal of the original sentence and
that his resentencing operates to start him with a clean
institutional slate. In advancing his argument, Donnelly cites
the rule of statutory construction "that a penal statute must be
construed strictly and that ambiguities must be resolved against
the state." Romero v. State, 792 P.2d 679, 682 (Alaska App.
1990); see also Tuckfield v. State, 805 P.2d 982, 985 (Alaska
App. 1991); Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction
59.03, 59.04, 59.06 (4th ed. 1986 rev.). However, as we have
previously stated,
This general rule, however, is not an
absolute. Strict construction does not
require that statutes be given the narrowest
meaning allowed by the language; rather, the
language should be given "a reasonable or
common sense construction, consonant with the
objectives of the legislature." The intent
of the legislature must govern and the
policies and purposes of the statute should
not be defeated.
Belarde v. Anchorage, 634 P.2d 567, 568 (Alaska App. 1981)
(quoting C. Dallas Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction
59.06, at 18-19 (4th ed. 1974)).
Under AS 33.20.010(a), Donnelly was entitled to receive
good time based upon his entire "term of imprisonment." We
interpret "term of imprisonment" to include all the time Donnelly
served under his original convictions for the same criminal
offense. It follows that, under AS 33.20.050, if during the time
of imprisonment Donnelly committed an offense or violated the
rules of the correctional facility, all or part of his good time
could be forfeited under the regulations of the DOC. This seems
to us to be the plain meaning of the statute. The language "if
the prisoner follows the rules of the correctional facility" in
AS 33.20.010(a) appears to merely tell prisoners that they are
entitled to receive one-third of their terms of imprisonment for
good time if they follow the rules of the correctional facility.
If the prisoner does not follow the rules of the correctional
facility during the "term of imprisonment," the good time is
subject to forfeiture under AS 33.20.050.
This interpretation is consistent with the obvious
legislative purpose of the statutes that award prisoners credit
for good time. These statutes are designed to reward prisoners
for good behavior during their terms of imprisonment.
Conversely, the statutes give the DOC a means of enforcing
discipline within correctional facilities. It seems contrary to
this legislative purpose to have prisoners confined by the DOC
who are not subject to the statutes. Donnelly's case is a good
illustration of the potential problems that might arise from his
interpretation of the statute. Donnelly served a substantial
period of time in prison under his original conviction. During
this period of time he committed numerous institutional
infractions. He is now arguing that, during this substantial
period of imprisonment, the DOC had no authority to forfeit good
time under the good-time statutes, yet he was entitled to receive
good time under the same statutes. Donnelly's interpretation
would lessen the control the DOC would have over sentenced
prisoners. Those prisoners whose convictions were reversed or
who were resentenced for any reason would reap the windfall of
having the DOC retroactively lose the ability to use the good-
time statutes to reward and punish prisoners in the manner the
legislature obviously intended.
We accordingly conclude that under AS 33.20.010(a)
Donnelly was entitled to receive good time based upon his entire
term of imprisonment. However, under AS 33.20.050, during his
entire term of imprisonment, which includes the time served under
the first sentence, Donnelly was subject to having the DOC
forfeit that good time. We therefore conclude that Judge
Gonzalez erred in finding that the DOC had no authority to
forfeit Donnelly's good time before Donnelly's resentencing on
July 23, 1990.
The judgment is REVERSED.
_______________________________
*Sitting by assignment made pursuant to article IV,
section 16 of the Alaska Constitution.
1. Donnelly had been incarcerated for several months
before his sentencing.
