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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
STATE OF ALASKA, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-3819
Petitioner, ) Trial Court No. 3KN-S90-1212
Cr
)
v. )
) O P
I N I O N
MELISSA SIVERLY, )
) [No. 1191 - December 27,
1991]
Respondent. )
________________________________)
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judi
cial District, Kenai, Lynn H. Christensen,
Magistrate.
Appearances: Joseph N. Levesque, Assistant
District Attorney, Nathan A. Callahan,
District Attorney, Kenai, and Charles E.
Cole, Attorney General, Juneau, for Petition
er. David E. Gabert and Allan Beiswenger,
Robinson, Beiswenger & Ehrhardt, Soldotna,
for Respondent.
Before: Bryner, Chief Judge, and Coats and
Mannheimer, Judges.
MANNHEIMER, Judge.
Melissa Siverly was charged with driving while her
license was suspended, AS 28.15.291. She asked the district
court to suppress the evidence against her, challenging the
legality of the traffic stop that led to the charge. Kenai
Magistrate Lynn H. Christensen granted Siverly's suppression
motion, and the State of Alaska petitioned this court for review.
We granted the State's petition, and we now reverse the decision
of the district court.
While on routine patrol on August 10, 1990, Kenai
Police Officer William Ahlfors saw a van make a right turn from
Bridge Access Road onto Beaver Loop Road. As the van made the
turn, the driver's door flew open; the driver, Siverly, reached
out and pulled the door closed. Based on this observation,
Ahlfors believed that Siverly might be operating an unsafe
vehicle. He pulled her over and then discovered that her
driver's license had been suspended.
Siverly asserted, and Magistrate Christensen agreed,
that Ahlfors's observation of the opening and closing of
Siverly's driver's-side door did not give the officer a suffi
cient basis for stopping Siverly's vehicle. Magistrate
Christensen ruled that the information available to Ahlfors did
not give him reason to believe that Siverly was operating an
unsafe vehicle.
We conclude that Ahlfors's stop of Siverly's vehicle
was lawful. The Alaska Administrative Code, 13 AAC 04.002,
forbids the driving of any vehicle "which is in an unsafe
condition". A police officer "having reasonable cause to believe
that a vehicle is unsafe ... may require the driver of the
vehicle to stop and submit the vehicle to an inspection and tests
as may be appropriate." 13 AAC 04.006(a). And, under 13 AAC
04.007, a police officer is authorized to issue a citation to the
driver of "a vehicle which is not in safe mechanical condition or
properly equipped as required in this chapter or in AS 28."1
Magistrate Christensen concluded that "the mere observa
tion of a door coming open, which was immediately closed by the
defendant, is not sufficient to give rise to a reasonable
suspicion that the vehicle was an unsafe vehicle". We disagree.
There are times when a driver, discovering that the
driver's-side door is not tightly shut, will push the door open
and then slam it closed. Such an action may not indicate any
defect in the vehicle. But Ahlfors saw Siverly's door fly open
without any propulsion from Siverly. Ahlfors could reasonably
conclude, from this observation, that the door's latching
mechanism was faulty and that the door was susceptible to
swinging open under the force of momentum.
Such a defect would make Siverly's vehicle unsafe.
When Siverly made right-hand turns or forceful stops, the door
could swing open and hit oncoming traffic or pedestrians. We
conclude that Ahlfors had reasonable cause to believe that
Siverly's vehicle was unsafe and that, under 13 AAC 04.002,
006(a), and 007, he was entitled to stop the vehicle for
inspection and possible citing of its driver.
Moreover, because Ahlfors had a reasonable suspicion
that Siverly's vehicle presented a danger to the public, he was
entitled to stop Siverly's vehicle under the line of cases
beginning with Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976).
Magistrate Christensen decided that the stop of Siverly's car
could not be justified under Coleman because "there was no other
traffic present at the time, and the officer observed no [moving]
traffic violations or any erratic driving". But the Coleman line
of cases does not require that an investigative stop be supported
by proof of immediate danger or by unambiguous observations that
the law is being violated. See Ebona v. State, 577 P.2d 698
(Alaska 1978), a case involving the investigatory stop of a
suspected intoxicated driver. In Ebona, the officer observed
Ebona's car swerving, going from the center line to the right-
hand edge, but at no time did Ebona's vehicle leave its proper
lane of travel. The Supreme Court upheld the investigatory stop
in spite of the police officer's explicit concession that he
never observed Ebona violate a traffic rule and that he watched
Ebona make two correct turns. Ebona, 577 P.2d at 701 n.12.
For these reasons, we find that Ahlfors's stop of
Siverly's vehicle was proper. The decision of the district court
is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED to the district court for
further proceedings.
_______________________________
1 In his decision, Magistrate Christensen relied on
AS 28.05.091, the statutory provision which authorizes police
officers and other designated employees of the Department of
Public Safety to impound vehicles which are so unsafe that they
should not be driven. While this statute relates to the concern
of vehicle safety, it is not precisely on point. The issue
presented in Siverly's case is a police officer's authority to
stop and cite the driver of an unsafe vehicle, not the officer's
authority to impound the vehicle.
