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THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
DAVID WILLIAMS, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-3435
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 3AN-S88-8484CR
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 1180 - December 13, 1991]
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Karl S. Johnstone, Judge.
Appearances: Susan Orlansky, Assistant
Public Defender, and John B. Salemi, Public
Defender, Anchorage, for Appellant. Shelley
K. Chaffin, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals,
Anchorage, and Charles E. Cole, Attorney
General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Judge, Coats, Judge,
and Andrews, Superior Court Judge.*
[Mannheimer, Judge, not participating.]
BRYNER, Chief Judge.
David Williams appeals his conviction of first-degree
murder, contending that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence and that the evidence at his trial
was insufficient. We affirm.
Williams and Deborah Goodlataw were drinking heavily on
the night of December 30-31, 1988, in the apartment they shared
in Anchorage. Williams became angry and assaulted Goodlataw. At
approximately 2 a.m., Williams called his former foster mother,
Carolyn Hanthorn, and told her that he thought he had killed
Goodlataw. Williams said he was not sure where he was.
Hanthorn reported Williams' call to the police. She
told the police that she did not know where Williams and
Goodlataw lived. She said that, a week previously, she had
dropped them off at an apartment building at 200 McCarrey Street,
but she was not sure if they lived there or were just visiting
friends. Hanthorn also apparently told the police that Goodlataw
and Williams might have a baby with them.
Between 3 a.m. and 9 a.m. that morning, the police
unsuccessfully checked five or six locations where they thought
Williams and Goodlataw might be, including the McCarrey Street
area. At 9:30 a.m., Officer Audie E. Holloway returned to 200
McCarrey Street and inquired in the manager's office concerning
Goodlataw and Williams. He learned that they were renting
apartment number two.
As Holloway approached apartment two, he saw clothing
on the ground outside the bedroom window. He also saw several
reddish-brown stains, which appeared to be blood, on the steps
leading to the door of the apartment. Holloway knocked several
times and identified himself. He could hear music playing inside
the apartment, but nobody answered the door.
Concerned that Goodlataw might be injured and require
medical attention, Holloway secured a passkey from the manager's
office and returned to the apartment. After knocking again and
receiving no response, he entered. In the bedroom, he found
Goodlataw, dead. Blood was spattered throughout the room.
Injuries visible on Goodlataw's face made it apparent that she
had been beaten. Subsequent investigation led to Williams'
arrest.
Prior to trial, Williams moved to suppress evidence
derived from Holloway's entry of apartment number two. He argued
that the warrantless entry was improper. The superior court
denied Williams' motion, finding the entry to be justified under
the emergency aid doctrine. Williams claims that the superior
court erred.
The emergency aid doctrine is a well recognized
exception to the warrant requirement. Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 392 (1978); Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834, 840-41
(Alaska 1975); Gallmeyer v. State, 640 P.2d 837, 841 (Alaska App.
1982). Under the doctrine, the warrantless entry of a dwelling
is allowed when an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that
there is an immediate need to take action to prevent death or to
protect persons or property from serious injury. Gallmeyer, 640
P.2d at 841-43.
For the emergency aid doctrine to be applicable in a
given case, three conditions must be met:
(1) The police must have reasonable
grounds to believe that there is an emergency
at hand and an immediate need for their
assistance for the protection of life or
property.
(2) The search must not be primarily
motivated by intent to arrest and seize
evidence.
(3) There must be some reasonable basis
approximating probable cause to associate the
emergency with the area or the place to be
searched.
Id. at 842. See also Johnson v. State, 662 P.2d 981, 985-86
(Alaska App. 1983) (listing eleven factors relevant in
determining if the emergency aid doctrine applies).
Here, Williams focuses his argument on the first and
third of these conditions. With respect to the first condition
-- reasonable grounds to believe that there was an emergency --
Williams insists that no need for immediate action existed under
the circumstances because the police were acting on a report that
Williams had killed Goodlataw, and not on information that
Goodlataw was injured. Moreover, the report had been made
approximately eight hours before the search.
It is well settled, however, that an emergency may
properly be found even when it is "much more probable that the
victim is dead than that [s]he is still alive." 2 W.R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure 6.6(a) at 700 (2d ed. 1987) (footnotes
omitted). Based on the uncertain nature of the information that
Williams gave to Hanthorn and that Hanthorn passed along to the
police, Holloway believed that "there was just as much a chance
of there being a body in there as there would be somebody in
there still alive." This belief was not unreasonable. Under
analogous circumstances, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated:
"Frequently, the report of a death proves inaccurate and a spark
of life remains. . . ." State v. Kraimer, 298 N.W.2d 568, 578
(Wis. 1980). Moreover, in the present case, Holloway had been
advised that Williams and Goodlataw might have an infant with
them.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the
superior court was not clearly erroneous in finding reasonable
grounds to believe that an emergency existed requiring immediate
intervention.
As to the third condition of the emergency aid doctrine
-- some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the
place searched -- Williams again focuses on the length of time
that elapsed between the initial report of a possible homicide
and Holloway's entry of apartment number two. According to
Williams, even if there was reason to believe Goodlataw may have
been injured and at home when Williams first called Hanthorn, the
belief was no longer reasonable eight hours later.
The passage of time, however, though relevant to the
possible existence of an emergency, is not determinative. State
v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1373 (R.I. 1984). In deciding that
an emergency might exist in Williams and Goodlataw's apartment,
Holloway acted on more than just the initial report of a possible
homicide. In addition, he observed apparent blood stains on the
steps of the apartment and saw clothing strewn about the yard
outside the window. Although Holloway heard music from within
the apartment, no one answered the door.
The superior court was not clearly erroneous in
concluding that these observations, combined with the initial
report of a possible homicide, provided a reasonable basis to
associate the emergency with the apartment.
There is no indication that Holloway's entry of the
apartment was primarily motivated by an intent to seize evidence
or make an arrest, the remaining condition for applying the
emergency aid doctrine. Accordingly, we conclude that the
superior court properly found the emergency aid doctrine
applicable.
Williams next contends that insufficient evidence was
presented at trial. Specifically, he argues that the state
failed to establish the cause of Goodlataw's death with adequate
certainty to permit conviction.
Evidence is sufficient to submit to the jury when the
record as a whole, considered in the light most favorable to the
state, would permit reasonable jurors to differ on the question
of whether guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Bush v. State, 397 P.2d 616, 618 (Alaska 1964); State v. Brown,
693 P.2d 324, 328 (Alaska App. 1984).
The dispute in the present case centers on the issue of
causation. Williams does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence establishing that he assaulted and injured Goodlataw.
Rather, he contends that there was inadequate evidence to prove
that the injuries he inflicted to Goodlataw caused her death.
The state's primary witness on causation was Dr.
Michael Propst, the forensic pathologist who examined Goodlataw's
body. According to Propst, the autopsy he performed revealed
multiple blunt-force external injuries to Goodlataw's face and
head, indicating that she had recently been beaten. These
injuries corresponded to potentially fatal internal injuries to
Goodlataw's brain.
Propst further testified, however, that his autopsy
revealed that Goodlataw's blood alcohol content at death was .665
percent, a potentially lethal level.
According to Propst, either the blunt-force injuries or
the alcohol, standing alone, might have been survivable, but
either might also have been fatal. Although Propst was unable to
prioritize between the injuries and the alcohol in terms of their
relative significance, he expressed the opinion that the two
combined to cause Goodlataw's death. Propst believed that even
if Goodlataw could not have survived the alcohol she consumed,
her injuries would have been a "significant contributing factor"
in her death.
Propst specifically expressed the opinion that
Goodlataw's injuries "definitely" contributed to her death. When
pressed on cross-examination as to whether he was convinced to a
reasonable medical certainty that Goodlataw's injuries
contributed to her death, Propst answered: "Yes, I am. In my
opinion the blunt force injuries played at least a role in the
death." Pressed again on the issue of reasonable medical
certainty on re-direct examination, Propst reiterated: "In my
opinion the blunt force injuries that Deborah Goodlataw received
were a cause of her death."
In response to Propst's testimony, Williams called Dr.
Michael Clark, another pathologist, who testified that, in his
opinion, Goodlataw would likely have died as the result of the
alcohol she ingested, regardless of whether she had sustained
physical injuries. Although acknowledging that her injuries
would have hampered her ability to survive the alcohol to at
least some extent, Clark characterized them as unlikely to have
resulted in death in and of themselves.
The state countered Clark's testimony by calling Drs.
Donald Rogers and Richard Brodsky on rebuttal. Rogers, also a
forensic pathologist, echoed Propst's view that both the alcohol
and the blunt-force injuries had combined to cause Goodlataw's
death. Rogers also expressed the belief that the amount of
alcohol Goodlataw had consumed was potentially survivable.
Brodsky, an Anchorage physician with experience in providing
emergency care for persons with elevated blood alcohol levels,
corroborated the view that Goodlataw could potentially have
survived had she not been beaten.
Viewing the totality of this evidence in the light most
favorable to the state, we believe that reasonable jurors could
have concluded that the state met its burden of proof on the
element of causation. The state was under no obligation to prove
that the injuries Williams inflicted were the sole cause of
Goodlataw's death:
A criminal defendant can be held
responsible only for injuries that "result
from" or are "caused by" his conduct. But
the defendant's conduct need not be the sole
factor in producing the injury. Rather, the
test is whether the defendant's conduct was a
"substantial factor" in bringing about the
result.
State v. Malone, _____ P.2d _____, Op. No. 1155 at 4 (Alaska
App., September 6, 1991) (citations omitted).
The expert testimony at trial strongly supported the
conclusion that Goodlataw's death resulted from the combined
effects of alcohol and her blunt-force injuries. While neither
Propst nor Rogers could pinpoint the importance of the injuries
vis-a-vis the alcohol, both clearly viewed them as a substantial
causal factor. Propst explicitly framed his opinion on this
issue in terms of reasonable medical certainty.
Given these circumstances, Williams' reliance on
Jennings v. State, 404 P.2d 652, 654 (Alaska 1965), is misplaced.
In Jennings, the Alaska Supreme Court indicated, in passing, that
a judgment of acquittal would be appropriate in a case where the
state failed to show which of two alternative potential causes
actually resulted in the victim's death. In contrast, when the
evidence in the present case is viewed in the light most
favorable to the state, it establishes that Goodlataw's death
resulted not from one of two mutually exclusive causes but rather
from the combined effect of alcohol and blunt-force injuries.
In fact, the circumstances of this case are virtually
indistinguishable from those considered by the Alaska Supreme
Court in Armstrong v. State, 502 P.2d 440, 443-46 (Alaska 1972).
In Armstrong, the victim died of asphyxia as a direct result of a
deep state of unconsciousness. Expert testimony indicated that
the victim had suffered a severe beating and was also severely
intoxicated. The state's expert witness was unable to say which
factor was more significant in producing the unconscious state
that resulted in death, but he believed both had played a
significant role.
In affirming the conviction, the court in Armstrong
rejected an argument similar to Williams', holding:
In this case expert testimony served to
reveal the physiological relationships
relevant to [the victim's] death; once these
were explained, the jury was competent to
make an independent determination of cause of
death on the basis of all relevant evidence
before it.
Our study of the record of the trial
below convinces us that sufficient evidence
was produced to present a jury question on
the issue of cause of death. Expert
testimony presented by both parties
established asphyxiation as the primary cause
of death. Dr. Rogers indicated a causal
connection between the beating and
asphyxiation, namely as a factor which, along
with extreme intoxication, contributed to the
depth of the reflex-inhibiting
unconsciousness. Even the defense expert
witness . . . admitted that the head injuries
were a "minor" contribution to [the victim's]
death, being sufficient to "cause a certain
additional grogginess . . . ." Additionally,
the jury had before it the testimony of
Officer Moerlins who detailed the condition
of the trailer and deceased as he found them.
The extent of the beating suffered by [the
victim] was also illustrated by photographs.
Viewed most favorably to the state, this
evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to
conclude, with the strength of conviction
required for a guilty verdict, that the acts
of appellant contributed to [the victim's]
demise.
Id. at 446 (footnote omitted).1
The conclusion reached by the supreme court in
Armstrong is equally applicable here. We hold that the trial
court did not err in denying Williams' motion for a judgment of
acquittal.
The conviction is AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
*Sitting by assignment made pursuant to article IV,
section 16 of the Alaska Constitution.
1. A dissent by two justices in Armstrong agreed with the
majority's view of the applicable law of causation but found the
expert testimony at trial equivocal on the issue of whether the
victim's unconsciousness resulted from the joint effects of
alcohol and the assault-related injuries. Id. at 452. Because
we find unequivocal evidence in the present case to support the
view that Goodlataw's death resulted from the combined effect of
alcohol and assault-related injuries, Williams' claim would not
succeed, even under the dissenting opinion in Armstrong.
