NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal
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THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
SIDNEY M. DeGROSS, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-3438
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 3AN-S85-7436CR
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. ) [No. 1152 - August 9, 1991]
______________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State
of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Victor D. Carlson, Judge.
Appearances: Larry Cohn, Anchorage, for
Appellant. Stephanie Rhoades, Assistant
District Attorney, Mary Anne Henry, Acting
District Attorney, Anchorage, and Douglas B.
Baily, Attorney General, Juneau, for
Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Judge, Andrews and
Hunt, Superior Court Judges.* [Coats and
Mannheimer, Judges, not participating.]
BRYNER, Chief Judge.
Sidney M. DeGross was convicted of two counts of first-
degree robbery and two counts of third-degree assault. Superior
Court Judge Victor D. Carlson sentenced DeGross to maximum terms
on all counts: twenty years for each robbery and five years for
each assault. Judge Carlson ordered the sentences to run
consecutively, for a total term of fifty years' imprisonment.
DeGross appealed his convictions and sentence. This court
affirmed the convictions but remanded for further sentencing
proceedings, concluding that the original sentencing findings
were inadequate. DeGross v. State, 768 P.2d 134 (Alaska App.
1989). On remand, Judge Carlson reimposed maximum consecutive
sentences. DeGross renews his appeal, challenging his sentence
as excessive. We reverse.
THE OFFENSES
DeGross' convictions resulted from his participation in
two separate armed robberies. On the night of October 23, 1985,
DeGross and a companion, Roger Thiel, entered a McDonalds
restaurant in Anchorage while a third companion waited for them
outside. DeGross carried a pistol, and Thiel a rifle. DeGross
fired a warning shot and ordered everybody to the floor. He held
his pistol to the manager's head and threatened to kill her if
she did not open the safe within twenty seconds. When the
manager failed in her first attempt, DeGross pressed the gun
closer and repeated his death threat. After securing the
contents of the safe, DeGross ordered the manager to empty the
restaurant's cash drawers.
As DeGross and Thiel prepared to leave, they noticed
David Odum, a McDonalds' employee they had previously been
acquainted with in school. Apparently concerned that Odum might
recognize and report them, they struck him with their guns and
threatened to kill him. As the men left McDonalds, DeGross
grabbed the manager by the hair and told her he would return to
kill her if she reported the robbery. DeGross and Thiel then
fled with approximately $4,000 in cash.
A week later, on Halloween night, 1985, DeGross and
several companions robbed a Carrs supermarket in Anchorage. This
time, Thiel stood watch outside as John Hennessey and DeGross
entered the store, both carrying handguns. The men fired a
warning shot. DeGross entered the manager's booth, threw the
manager to the floor, and ordered her to open the safe. He fired
another shot for emphasis. After emptying the safe and one of
the store's cash registers, DeGross pointed his gun at the
manager's head and threatened to come back and kill her if
anything went wrong. DeGross and Hennessey then fled.
Upon emerging from the front doors of the store,
DeGross and Hennessey encountered police officers, who were
responding to a silent alarm. The two men immediately reentered
the store and ran toward the back doors.
Meanwhile, two other officers, Laren Zager and William
Webster, pulled into the area behind the supermarket. Thiel
opened fire on them. When DeGross and Hennessey ran out the back
of the store, Zager and Webster were occupied with Thiel.
DeGross and Hennessey began firing at the officers. Hennessey
ran toward Zager, firing. Zager returned fire and fatally
wounded Hennessey. As Zager attempted to tend to the wounded
Hennessey, DeGross fired two shots at the officer. Zager and
Webster both fired back at DeGross, who ran into the store.
As DeGross ran through the store again, he reloaded his
pistol. Once out in front of the store, DeGross ran toward the
highway; two officers, David Sugden and Nancy Wood, pursued.
DeGross fired four shots at Sugden and two at Wood. A short time
later, two other officers managed to stop DeGross. After a brief
struggle, they subdued and arrested him.
THE OFFENDER
DeGross was twenty-one years old when he committed
these offenses. He had never previously been convicted of a
felony but had one misdemeanor conviction for theft and
possession of marijuana, for which he received ten days in jail
with fifty additional days suspended, and one conviction for
driving while intoxicated, resulting in a thirty-day sentence of
which twenty-seven were suspended. DeGross' juvenile record
consisted of a single delinquency adjudication for a second-
degree burglary. The offense involved the breaking and entering
of a store in a shopping mall four years previously. He was
placed on juvenile probation and successfully completed his
probationary term.
From information in the presentence report, it appears
that DeGross enjoyed a fairly stable family background. His
educational history is unremarkable. After experiencing minor
problems with fighting and truancy, DeGross left high school
briefly but eventually returned and graduated. Following
graduation, DeGross remained employed fairly consistently in a
variety of jobs.
DeGross has experienced a long-term problem with
alcohol abuse. He was married in 1983 but separated as a result
of drinking and assaultive conduct toward his wife. By all
accounts, DeGross also suffers from a problem with anger towards
women. At one point, he apparently attended the Male Awareness
Program in Anchorage to help deal with the anger issue.
By the time of his second sentencing hearing, DeGross
had been incarcerated in connection with the current charges for
more than four years. During that time, his institutional record
was poor and included numerous disciplinary actions for minor
infractions ranging from fighting with and threatening other
inmates to possessing tattooing equipment. DeGross did not
participate in any rehabilitation programs while incarcerated.
At the most recent sentencing hearing, the court was
provided with four separate psychological evaluations -- two
submitted by DeGross and two by the state. While the examiners
disagreed to a certain extent on precise diagnosis, preferred
modality for treatment, and ultimate prospects for
rehabilitation, they broadly concurred that DeGross displayed
character traits indicative of an antisocial personality
disorder, a problem exacerbated by his alcohol abuse.
The examiners further agreed that a diagnosis of
antisocial personality disorder is typical of offenders who, like
DeGross, are convicted of armed robbery and similar crimes of
violence. Although the examiners generally concurred that
antisocial personality disorders are difficult to treat and that
the statistical success rate for treatment is relatively low,
they emphasized that such a diagnosis is a poor predictor of
future behavior in individual cases.
THE SENTENCING
For the October 23, 1985, McDonalds robbery, DeGross
was charged with one count of first-degree robbery and one count
of assault in the second degree (for striking Odum with his
pistol). A jury convicted DeGross of the robbery charge but
acquitted him of the assault.
In connection with the Halloween robbery of Carrs,
DeGross was charged with one count of first-degree robbery and
two counts of attempted murder (for firing on Officers Sugden and
Wood). DeGross entered a plea of no contest to the first-degree
robbery but stood trial on the attempted murder charges. The
jury acquitted him of attempted murder, as well as of the lesser-
included offense of first-degree assault, but convicted on both
counts for the lesser offense of third-degree assault.
DeGross' first-degree robbery convictions are class A
felonies, for which the maximum term is twenty years'
imprisonment per count. AS 11.41.500(b); AS 12.55.125(c). As a
first felony offender who used a firearm in committing the
offense, DeGross was subject to a presumptive term of seven years
for each robbery. AS 12.55.125(c)(2). The third-degree assault
convictions are class C felonies, for which the maximum term is
five years. AS 11.41.220(b); AS 12.55.125(e). Because the
assaults were committed against police officers, DeGross was
subject to a one-year presumptive term on each count. AS
12.55.155(e)(3).
At the original sentencing hearing, Judge Carlson
imposed maximum consecutive terms totaling fifty years in prison.
On appeal, this court did not reach the issue of whether this
sentence was excessive. Instead, we remanded for resentencing,
finding the original sentencing remarks inadequate to allow
meaningful appellate review. DeGross, 768 P.2d at 138. In
remanding the case, we directed the sentencing court to make
specific findings concerning the aggravating factors applicable
to the various charges. Id. We also indicated that, before
considering a composite sentence of more than ten years, the
court should expressly allow DeGross an opportunity for a
psychiatric evaluation. Id. at 142. We further stated that the
sentencing court should decide on the total length of DeGross'
sentence "only after appropriate consideration of cases involving
other offenders convicted of like crimes." Id. at 141.
In connection with the latter aspect of our decision,
we noted that a review of recent sentencing decisions involving
youthful first offenders convicted of multiple armed robberies
indicated that a term of ten years or less was an appropriate
benchmark. We specified that, "[i]n the event the sentencing
court concludes that DeGross' total sentence should substantially
exceed the benchmark sentences established by this court for
similarly situated offenders, it should make express findings
distinguishing this case." Id. Finally, we emphasized that the
sentencing court would be justified in imposing a total sentence
of more than twenty years (the maximum term for DeGross' most
serious offense, first-degree robbery) only if it expressly found
such a term to be "actually necessary for the protection of the
community and that DeGross can neither be rehabilitated nor
deterred by the imposition of a shorter sentence." Id. at 141-
42.
On remand, Judge Carlson, after conducting an
additional hearing, made specific findings concerning the various
aggravating factors applicable to DeGross' charges.1 DeGross
argued for a total sentence of no more than ten years of
unsuspended time. The state argued for a composite term of up to
thirty years in prison. Judge Carlson disagreed with both
recommendations. Finding DeGross to be a worst offender with no
prospects for rehabilitation, Judge Carlson reimposed maximum
sentences on all counts and again ordered them to run
consecutively for a total of fifty years.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, DeGross first contends that the sentencing
court erred in determining the aggravating factors applicable to
his case. DeGross further contends that the court gave undue
weight to some factors and failed to adequately explain its
reliance on others.
Having reviewed the record, we find substantial
evidence to support the sentencing court's rulings; with but one
exception,2 we conclude that the court was not clearly erroneous
in determining the aggravating factors applicable in this case.
We further conclude that the sentencing court adequately
explained the weight it accorded to the various factors, and we
are not persuaded that the court gave any particular factor or
combination of factors undue emphasis.
DeGross alternatively contends that the total sentence
he received is excessive. He insists that the sentencing court
erred in finding him to be a worst offender, that a term of fifty
years is disproportionately high in comparison to other cases
involving similarly situated offenders, and that the record does
not support the conclusion that maximum consecutive sentences are
actually necessary for the protection of the public.
We turn first to DeGross' contention that he should not
have been characterized as a worst offender. DeGross argues that
he was only twenty-one years old when he committed these offenses
and had no prior felony convictions. A defendant can be found to
be a worst offender, however, based not only on prior background,
but also on the seriousness of the conduct involved in the case
for which conviction has been entered. State v. Wortham, 537
P.2d 1117, 1120 (Alaska 1975).
In this case, even though DeGross is a youthful first
offender, he stands convicted of two counts of robbery and two
counts of assault; the crimes arise from two separate incidents.
Each of DeGross' robberies was carefully planned. The robberies
were perpetrated by at least three people, all heavily armed;
DeGross was the leader of the group.
In each robbery, multiple victims were placed in
imminent risk of serious physical injury; at least one victim
received some physical injury in each case. Both robberies
involved the taking or attempted taking of relatively large sums
of cash.
DeGross perpetrated his offenses in a particularly
violent manner. He used considerable gratuitous violence in each
robbery, and threatened considerably greater violence. Of
crucial significance is the violence DeGross and his companions
used as they attempted to leave the scene of the Carrs robbery.
DeGross, Hennessey, and Thiel willingly engaged in an open gun
battle with police officers who were attempting to apprehend
them. As a direct result, Hennessey was killed.
DeGross, heavily armed, personally fired shots at four
different officers. He was convicted of third-degree assault for
the shots he directed at two of the officers. The jury did
acquit DeGross of attempted murder and first-degree assault,
apparently finding a reasonable doubt as to whether he
specifically intended to kill or seriously injure the officers.
In determining the seriousness of DeGross' conduct for sentencing
purposes, however, the court was not bound by the jury's
acquittal but was entitled to rely on its own view of the facts.
See Brakes v. State, 796 P.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Alaska App. 1990);
Ridgely v. State, 739 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Alaska App. 1987); Huckaby
v. State, 632 P.2d 975, 976 (Alaska App. 1981). Judge Carlson
made it clear that he interpreted the evidence less charitably
than the jury. The judge expressly found that DeGross had fired
at the officers with intent to kill or injure them. This factual
finding was not clearly erroneous.
Under comparable circumstances, the Alaska Supreme
Court has not hesitated to approve sentencing courts' worst-
offender findings, even as to youthful offenders with relatively
favorable criminal histories. See, e.g., LaBarbera v. State, 598
P.2d 947 (Alaska 1979); Ferguson v. State, 590 P.2d 43 (Alaska
1979); Fox v. State, 569 P.2d 1335 (Alaska 1977).3 Considering
the totality of the circumstances, we find abundant evidence to
support the sentencing court's conclusion that DeGross qualifies
as a worst offender.
In and of itself, however, the sentencing court's worst-
offender finding does not justify sentencing DeGross to a total
of more than twenty years -- the maximum sentence for first-
degree robbery, the most serious offense for which DeGross was
convicted. See DeGross, 768 P.2d at 140. As we made clear in
our original opinion, maximum consecutive sentences totaling
fifty years would not be proper absent a further express finding
that such sentences are "actually necessary for the protection of
the community and that DeGross can neither be rehabilitated nor
deterred by the imposition of a shorter sentence." Id. at 141-
42. While the sentencing court made such a finding, the record
does not, in our view, support it.
In finding DeGross incorrigible and undeterrable, the
sentencing court, on remand, relied most heavily on DeGross'
psychological evaluations, which established that DeGross suffers
from an antisocial personality disorder. Because persons who
suffer from antisocial personality disorders are generally not
readily amenable to rehabilitation, Judge Carlson reasoned that
DeGross poses an ongoing danger from which the community must be
protected on a continuing basis. Judge Carlson also pointed to
the extreme violence DeGross exhibited in committing his current
offenses, to his prior delinquency adjudication, to his problem
with alcohol abuse, and to his poor institutional record.
Having thoroughly reviewed the sentencing record, we
must conclude that the exceptionally strong reliance placed by
the sentencing court on DeGross' character disorder is not
justified. The record certainly supports a finding that DeGross
suffers from an antisocial personality disorder. The record also
supports a finding that persons similarly afflicted are on the
whole relatively poor candidates for treatment and
rehabilitation. These findings, however, cannot be deemed
determinative.
While establishing that DeGross suffers from a
personality disorder that does not readily lend itself to
treatment, the expert testimony and evidence in this case also
establishes that antisocial personality disorders are common, if
not typical, among offenders who, like DeGross, have been
convicted of armed robbery and similar offenses. Thus, standing
alone, the fact that DeGross suffers from an antisocial
personality disorder does not justify singling him out for a
sentence drastically more severe than the presumptive sentence
specified by the legislature or from that typically received by
similarly situated offenders.
Moreover, undue reliance on the poor success rates
usually experienced in treating persons with antisocial
personalities is troubling. Rates of success in treatment
address the issue of rehabilitation, not the issue of deterrence.
We find little in the sentencing record suggesting that persons
suffering from antisocial personality disorders cannot, as a
whole, be deterred by a period of incarceration coupled with the
threat of further incarceration.
Even more fundamentally, while statistical rates of
success in rehabilitation may be helpful indicators of general
potential for rehabilitation or the lack thereof, they do not
speak to the individual case or establish whether a particular
offender actually can be rehabilitated. In fact, the expert
testimony and evidence in the present case establishes, without
contradiction, that the diagnosis of an antisocial personality
disorder is in itself an unreliable and inaccurate predictor of
future behavior in any given case. Virtually all the expert
witnesses concurred that the most accurate, if not the only
accurate, gauge of future danger is an offender's history of
prior misconduct.
Here, despite the seriousness of the conduct involved
in the current offenses, the fact remains that DeGross is a
youthful offender who has no history of prior similar misconduct
and who has never before demonstrated a proclivity toward
comparable acts of aggravated violence. DeGross' criminal
history consists of a single delinquency adjudication for a
property offense -- for which DeGross successfully completed a
period of juvenile probation --and two adult misdemeanor
convictions, for which DeGross served a total of thirteen days in
jail.
DeGross' more recent institutional record, while far
from exemplary, consists of infractions for fighting and other
less serious misbehavior. Furthermore, although DeGross has not
displayed any particular interest in participating in
rehabilitation while incarcerated, neither has he established a
history of failure in rehabilitation.
DeGross' psychological makeup, his prior delinquency
and misdemeanor convictions, and his poor institutional record
are not insignificant considerations for sentencing purposes.
These factors, combined with the highly serious misconduct in his
current offenses, afford little affirmative basis for optimism
concerning DeGross' prospects for rehabilitation. Considering
the record as a whole, a sentence geared toward deterrence,
community condemnation, and isolation is certainly appropriate,
and emphasis on the goal of rehabilitation seems unjustified.
Beyond this, however, we find no concrete basis to
support the sentencing court's hard and fast conclusion that
DeGross is wholly incorrigible -- that he is utterly incapable of
being rehabilitated or deterred and that the only recourse is to
isolate him from the public for as long as possible. We conclude
that the superior court's decision to base DeGross' sentence on
the assumption that he is incorrigible was unjustified.
Our conclusion is fortified by a comparison of DeGross'
case to prior similar cases. In our original decision remanding
this case for resentencing, we directed the superior court to
decide upon a composite sentence "only after appropriate
consideration of cases involving other offenders convicted of
like crimes." DeGross, 768 P.2d at 141. Our directive was
motivated by considerations of uniformity. See AS 12.55.005(1).
The only allusion to other cases contained in the superior
court's sentencing remarks on remand consisted of cursory
references to Schuenemann v. State, 781 P.2d 1005 (Alaska App.
1989), and Contreras v. State, 767 P.2d 1169 (Alaska App. 1989) -
- recent decisions in which this court approved extremely lengthy
consecutive sentences calculated to assure that the defendant
remained "under correctional supervision for the remainder of his
life." Schuenemann, 781 P.2d at 1009.
DeGross' case is readily distinguishable from
Schuenemann, Contreras, and other cases in the same category.4
All cases in this category involve offenders who were actually
convicted of more serious classes of crimes than DeGross, and who
also had "past proven criminal record[s]," Contreras, 767 P.2d
at 1175 -- that is, offenders whose criminal histories had
"establish[ed] an ingrained, compulsive criminal pattern."
Schuenemann, 781 P.2d at 1009. In contrast, the sentencing
record in the current case cannot support the conclusion that
DeGross is a habitual offender. See, e.g., Benefield v. State,
559 P.2d 91, 98 (Alaska 1977).
Our review of prior sentencing decisions involving
generally similar offenses has not revealed any case that even
begins to approach the total fifty-year term imposed here.
Indeed, barring instances in which the defendant was
simultaneously convicted of murder or some comparable
unclassified felony, we are aware of no decision of this court or
the Alaska Supreme Court approving a composite sentence of more
than twenty years in an armed robbery case, even when the case
involved multiple convictions or intentional shootings.5
The case law thus strongly suggests the appropriateness
of a composite sentence in this case totaling no more than twenty
years of unsuspended time. We recognize, however, the
limitations of relying too heavily on prior sentencing cases.
Most cases involving offenses comparably serious to DeGross' were
decided under Alaska's former robbery statute, which provided for
a maximum term of fifteen years, rather than twenty years. See
former AS 11.15.240. Moreover, DeGross' case distinguishes
itself from prior cases by its extreme violence -- violence that
included attempts to shoot numerous police officers and that
resulted in the shooting death of one of DeGross' companions.
Given these considerations, and having independently
reviewed the entire sentencing record, we conclude that a
composite sentence of thirty years of unsuspended imprisonment
would be justified, despite DeGross' status as a youthful first
offender. See, e.g., Ferguson v. State, 606 P.2d at 385 (Burke,
J., dissenting); Cleary v. State, 548 P.2d at 957-58 (Burke, J.,
dissenting). See also Hintz v. State, 627 P.2d 207 (Alaska
1981); Patterson v. State, 689 P.2d 146 (Alaska App. 1984);
Tookak v. State, 648 P.2d 1018 (Alaska App. 1982). In our view,
however, a longer total sentence would not be justified, and the
total sentence of fifty years actually imposed below is clearly
mistaken. McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974).
The sentence is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for
resentencing in conformity herewith.
_______________________________
*Sitting by assignment made pursuant to article IV,
section 16 of the Alaska Constitution.
1. The aggravating factors and the offenses to which Judge
Carlson found them applicable are as follows:
a. The defendant was previously
adjudicated as a delinquent for conduct
amounting to a felony (AS 12.55.155(c)(19))
-- found applicable to all counts.
b. The defendant's conduct caused
physical injury to a person other than an
accomplice (AS 12.55.155(c)(1)) -- applicable
to the two robbery charges only.
c. The defendant's conduct manifested
deliberate cruelty (AS 12.55.155(c)(2)) --
applicable to the two robbery counts only.
d. The defendant was the leader of a
group of three or more persons (AS
12.55.155(c)(3)) -- applicable to all
offenses.
e. The defendant's conduct created a
risk of imminent physical injury to three or
more persons (AS 12.55.155(c)(6)) --
applicable to robberies only.
f. The defendant's conduct was
knowingly directed at police officers (AS
12.55.155(c)(13)) -- applicable to the Carrs
robbery only.
g. The defendant's conduct was among
the most serious included in the definition
of the offense (AS 12.55.155(c)(10)) --
applicable to the supermarket robbery and
assault convictions only.
h. The defendant knew that the offense
involved more than one victim (AS
12.55.155(c)(9)) -- applicable to the two
robberies only.
2. The sentencing court found all of DeGross' offenses to
be aggravated under AS 12.55.155(c)(3)(the defendant was a leader
of a group of three or more persons), even though the state gave
notice of this aggravating factor only as to the two robbery
charges and not as to the assaults. In our view, the court erred
in finding this factor applicable to the assault charges without
prior notice to DeGross. Given the nature and significance of
the other aggravating factors found applicable to those charges,
however, this error, in context, is plainly harmless.
3. In arguing that he should not have been characterized
as a worst offender, DeGross relies heavily on a number of other
cases in which this court has considered sentences involving
youthful first offenders convicted of multiple armed robberies.
In our original decision in this case, we noted that these cases
indicate that a total sentence of no more than ten years of
unsuspended incarceration is an appropriate benchmark. See
DeGross, 768 P.2d at 140 (citing Hale v. State, 764 P.2d 313
(Alaska App. 1988); Townsel v. State, 763 P.2d 1353 (Alaska App.
1988); Williams v. State, 759 P.2d 575 (Alaska App. 1988)).
Relying on this ten-year benchmark, DeGross contends that the
sentencing court's worst-offender finding is unjustified since
classifying him as a worst offender would justify a sentence of
at least twenty years -- the maximum term for first-degree
robbery, the most serious offense for which DeGross was
convicted. See, e.g., Hancock v. State, 741 P.2d 1210, 1214 n.2
(Alaska App. 1987).
The validity of the ten-year benchmark referred to in
our earlier decision, however, has been called into question.
Compare State v. Wentz, 805 P.2d 962 (Alaska 1991), with Williams
v. State, 809 P.2d 931 (Alaska App. 1991), modifying Williams v.
State, 800 P.2d 955 (Alaska App. 1990). Even assuming that the
ten-year benchmark remains valid, it would not be inconsistent
with a worst-offender finding in DeGross' case. As was implicit
in our original decision in this case, DeGross' overall conduct
is exceptionally serious and, as such, plainly justifies
departure from the benchmark indicated in other cases involving
first offenders convicted of multiple armed robberies.
4. See, e.g., Newcomb v. State, 800 P.2d 935 (Alaska App.
1990); Murray v. State, 770 P.2d 1131 (Alaska App. 1989); Wortham
v. State, 689 P.2d 1133 (Alaska App. 1984).
5. See, e.g., Dunn v. State, 653 P.2d 1071 (Alaska 1982);
Wightman v. State, 606 P.2d 797 (Alaska 1980); Ferguson v. State,
590 P.2d 43 (Alaska 1979), on remand, 606 P.2d 382 (Alaska 1980);
Putnam v. State, 600 P.2d 1096 (Alaska 1979); Walls v. State, 598
P.2d 949 (Alaska 1979); LaBarbera v. State, 598 P.2d 947 (Alaska
1979); Good v. State, 590 P.2d 420 (Alaska 1979); Collins v.
State, 574 P.2d 1278 (Alaska 1978); Creed v. State, 573 P.2d 1379
(Alaska 1978); Fox v. State, 569 P.2d 1335 (Alaska 1977); Cleary
v. State, 548 P.2d 952 (Alaska 1976), on remand, 564 P.2d 374
(Alaska 1977); Davenport v. State, 543 P.2d 1204 (Alaska 1975),
on remand, 564 P.2d 69 (Alaska 1977); Bragg v. State, 560 P.2d
391 (Alaska 1977); Benefield v. State, 559 P.2d 91 (Alaska 1977).
